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Preface 
This essay is a revised version of my senior thesis, which was sub-
mitted to Stanford University for the bachelor of science degree in the spring 
of H185. In early 1984, I was exploring possible topics for an essay in the 
humanities honors program, which is open to undergraduates in any depart-
ment at Stanford who wish to do a thesis incorporating disciplines outside 
their majors. I narrowed down the project to one that would incorporate 
ideas from logic and the study of language in an empirical analysis of ar-
guments, and I applied through the Stanford Overseas Studies program to 
spend the autumn quarter of that year in Oxford, on the idea that debates 
at the Oxford Union Society and the philosophical traditions of Oxford 
would provide good fodder for my research. I cajoled Professor John Perry 
in the Philosophy Department, whom I had known from a course in 1982, to 
be my advisor for the project. His laboratory, the Center for the Study of 
Language and Information, was an attractively interdisciplinary environment 
for a statistics major with interests in data analysis and artificial intelligence 
trying to tackle issues in linguistics, philosophy and logic. 
The spring and summer months of 1984 provided my first introduction 
to some of the diverse fields I was attempting to cross. Mary Pratt's class 
on "Discourse and Ideology" introduced me to some issues in language, and 
a directed reading under Marsh McCall that same spring provided me with 
some background in classical rhetoric and traditional logic. A summer inter-
nship at NCR Corporation in Colorado gave me the chance to learn quite 
broadly about issues and techniques in artificial intelligence, including the 
problems involved in getting a computer to reason by analogy. Yet I set off 
to Europe late in the summer without a clearly defined topic for my thesis. 
Professor Perry had set me up to meet with Professor J. O. Urmson in Ox-
ford, who welcomed me into his home during several autumn afternoons for 
some tutoring in linguistic philosophy and discussion of my essay. The staffs 
of the Stanford Program in Oxford, the Oxford Union, BaHiol College, and 
the Bodleian and British Libraries also helped to make my three months in 
Britain a productive time. After attending some debates, philosophy society 
meetings and lectures during the Michaelmas term and spending long hours 
in Oxford's many bookstores, I decided on the problem of analogy in late 
October. 
I returned to Stanford in January, 1985, and began working through 
ideas about analogical reasoning on a weekly basis with John Perry. A small 
amount of funding from the System Development Foundation grant to CSLI 
helped to tide me over during the remaining two quarters over which this 
project ranged, supplementing the generous support from my parents, Ber-
wyn and Gail Davies, and the moral support of my sister, Lyn. After my 
graduation I presented the CSLI Talk, "A Situational Theory of Analogy", 
based on my thesis, and received helpful feedback over the summer as a 
result of the seminar and follow-up talks given at NCR in Colorado and 
MCC in Texas. The revised version reflects that feedback and the help I 
received from many who were willing to discuss the thesis with me at CSLI 
·and later during the fall when I began work at SRI. 
Todd Davies 
November 6, 1985 
Menlo Park, California 
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Arguments that make their point by means of 
similarities are imposters, and unless you are 
on your guard, will quite readily deceive you . 
Simmias in Plato's 
Phaedo 
All perception of truth is the detection of an 
analogy. We reason from our hands to our head . 
Henry David Thoreau 
Journal 
September 5, 1851 
• 
I. Analogy and 'Analogy' 
In an analogy, we suppose, there is something of value. It may compel 
a new conclusion, or merely hint at one; in the absence of direct evidence it 
seems to allow us to infer what we are unable to know with certainty. I can-
not really know, for instance, that other people have minds which give them 
the kinds of experiences my mind gives me, but an inference from analogy, 
perhaps exclusively, gives me the feeling that they do. Many philosophical 
problems are in fact questions about the soundness of some analogical ar-
gument. The existence of God has not been proven to the satisfaction of 
science, but arguments by analogy allow one to conclude that God exists, or 
perhaps that no God exists. 
So these • conclusions· are strangely inconclusive. Perhaps conclusions 
are not what we get from analogy at all; indeed perhaps analogy is a fraud 
and our intuition that it is useful rests on a mistake. In any case, the status 
of what we infer by analogy has proven surprisingly difficult to characterize. 
J. L. Austin pointed out that we do not ordinarily claim to know by anal-
ogy, only to argue by it. l If we are convinced by an analogy, then, our in-
ference is a kind of belief, the grounding for which is the subject of this es-
say. 
In beginning a study of analogy one might well ask the simple ques-
tion, ·What is m· Following the tradition of linguistic philosophy, I would 
like firstly to explore the uses of the word 'analogy', being mindful that the 
concept I wish to analyze may be only one among a collection of its possible 
meanings. In his writings, John Stuart Mill gave the term a dubious distinc-
tion: ·There is no word ... ,· he wrote, ·which is used more loosely or in a 
greater variety of senses, than Analogy .• 2 
Still the word does seem to have a general meaning, being roughly 
• likeness, not including identity·. What proves more difficult to state is 
just what ·an analogy· is, or rather what sort of thing it is. We speak of 
an analogy being • invoked· or being • good or bad·, but what other things 
might we speak this way about? • Analogy· may variously be the basis for a 
mode of reasoning, or a relation between uses of words, or a type of relation 
that can exist between objects, but • the analogy· seems to refer to some-
thing other than just single instances of these. For example, we may say 
with equal confidence that ·similarity· is a basis for reasoning or is a rela-
tion between senses or things; but we would not, I think, say • the similarity 
between A and B is good· or • he invoked a likeness· or ·let me try this 
similarity out on you·. 'Analogy' basically means • similarity. 3, but 'an 
analogy' often means something close to • an idea that there is a similarity· 
rather than • a similarity·. 
All of this is just a way to say that the word 'analogy' functions 
analogously, not identically, in different types of sentences. Furthermore, 
the modern uses of 'analogy' have been derived by analogy from older uses. 
Since the word's evolution and its different modern uses are a barrier to 
·deciphering the literature on analogy, sorting these out is an important first 
lAustin,"Other Minds" ,Philosophical Papers,p. 77 
2Mill,"Of Analogy "(Ch. 20),A System of Logic,p. 393 
30f course, the language is ever changing and recently analogy has orten been rererred to 
as a mode of reasoning itself ratber than the basis for one 
2 
step in researching how others have approached the particular problems oC 
analogy with which I am concerned. 
The concept oC analogy is as old as philosophy itselC. Ironically, the 
general modern sense oC 'analogy' (-likeness in non-identity-) derives not 
Crom a single Greek word but, apparently, Crom two words which had cer-
tain similarities oC meaning.4 The word ava)..O"(ul, or -proportion -, was im-
ported Crom mathematics by Plato to characterize a resemblance oC relation 
between two pairs of terms in the general form - a is to b as c is to d - or, 
symbolically, a:b::c:d. Meanwhile, Plato was also developing the notion oC 
1rapa6fvwa, or example cases Cor use by comparison with a lesser-known case 
-in order to discover the true nature of both-.5 The meaning oC 1rapa6u'Ypa 
was Curther deCined by Aristotle to be a method oC - rhetorical induction - or 
argument by example.6 This resemblance of particular to particular7 was 
kept distinct from four-term relational resemblance in Greek texts, but 
ava)..O"(ta and the Aristotelian sense of 1rapa6u'Ypa seemed in Latin works to 
collapse into the term ana/ogia while the Latin paradigma came to mean 
something close to -paradigm-.8 Thus could Seneca the Younger say that 
concepts are -comprehended by analogy-,9 although, despite Quintilian's 
objections,10 there remained those who kept the word ana/ogia exclusively 
to mean ava)..O"(ta. 
In ordinary language we now use 'analogy' to reCer generally to like-
ness between different situations. We do not say - argument by paradigm - , 
and - argument by example- usually refers to reasoning Crom single ex-
amples, used without a target situation, to yield a generalization. What 
Aristotle analyzed in the Rhetoric and in the Organon (see section IT oC this 
essay) has become the modern concept oC analogy. How this happened has 
been the subject of research by fine scholars in theology, rhetoric, and the 
4Measell," Classical Bases or the Concept or Analogy" ,Journal oJ the American Forensic 
A880ciation,!Q,p. 1 
5Ibid.,p.2 
6Ibid .,pp. 3-5 
7Lloyd,Poiarity and Analogy: Two Types oJ Argumentation in Early Greek Thought,p. 
408 
80p. Cit.,Measell,p. 8; Liddell and Scott A Greek-English Lexicon; Lewis and Schort, A 
Latin Dictionary; Hesse," Aristotle's Logic or Analogy" ,Models and Analogies in 
Science,pp. 130-156 argues that the origin or the modern sense or 'analogy' comes during 
Aristotle's discussion or likeness in Topics 
. 9Seneca the Younger,Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morale8,LXX,tr. R. M. Grummere,Loeb 
Classical Library (3 vols: Cambridge,Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1925) cited 
in Op. Cit.,Measell,p. 9 
10Quintilian,lnatitutio Oratoria,!,ti&,tr. H. E. Butler,Loeb Classical Lib., 1920, cited in 
Ibid .,p. 9; I disagree with Measell that ava)..O"(ta maps onto the modern notion or 
"rigurative analogy "-Aristotle,The "Art" oJ Rhetoric,!!,~,pp. 273-279, speaks or 
paradigms which are historical parallels, close comparisons, and Cables, so it seems to me 
that figurative analogy, as well as literal, derives rrom 1rapa6u'1PO: since fables are 
metaphorical analogies. 
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classics, whom I have merely been summarizing. l1 Of course, the story is not 
so simple because in addition to the general modern meaning of 'analogy' 
there is a host of more specialized definitions which might apply depending 
on who is writing about it. The Miller Analogies Test, for example, involves 
solving for the fourth term in classical analogies. Research on -analogy- in 
psychology and education has orten focused on this type.12 Thomists and 
philosophers of theology use 'analogy' to refer to the analogy of names as 
delineated by Aquinas and Cajetan.13 Natural language semanticists and 
philosophers of language concern themselves, for the most part, with 
analogous word usage.14 Biologists writing about 'analogy' are usually refer-
ring to functionally similar physical features of different species (as opposed 
to 'homology,).15 Language acquisition theorists study analogy as a process 
for learning morphology and syntax.16 'Analogy' in mathematics refers to 
similarities between different operations,17 while in literature it may refer to 
a • figure of speech· as do 'hyperbole', 'metaphor', and 'simile' .18 Finally, in 
cognitive science there is a growing literature on analogy as a form of men-
tal or knowledge representation, in which the representation resembles in 
some way the object of one's thought (e.g., a diagram) as opposed to 
thoughts being about things symbolically or applicatively.IO 
But I am not going to examine any of the issues on the foregoing list, 
at least not specifically. What I propose to discuss is 'analogy' in its general, 
ordinary language sense, which I construe as analogy, or similarity, between 
situations. Philosophical inquiries about and attempts to account for anal-
ogy have roughly Callen into three categories since classical times, according 
to James Ross. 20 There is analogia nominum (the analogy of meaning or of 
names), about which Ross writes, analogia rationis (analogy of reason), and 
analogia entis (analogy of being, or among things). 
llln addition to Measell and Lloyd, see also the history of the Thomistic concept of anal-
ogy in Lyttkens,The Analogy Between God and the World; The speculations of Joseph in 
Introduction to Logic,p. 537, seem to be supplanted by Measell's findings. 
12See, for example, Sternberg,lntelligence, In/ormation Proce~~ing, and Analogical 
Reaaoning 
13See Op. Cit.,Lyttkens; Burrell,Analogy and Philosophical Language; Mcinerny ,Studies 
in Analogy; and Bochenski, "On Analogy" ,The Thomist,ll,pp. 425-447 
l4See Ross,Portraying Analogy (which also discusses analogy in religion and in law); 
MacDonald, "The Philosopher's Use of Analogy" ,Logic and Language; 
Hofstadter,"Metamagical Themas"(on Analogy),Scienti/ic American,Sept. 1081,pp. 18-30; 
Anttila,Analogy and Anttila and Brewer,Analogy: A Basic Bibliography 
15Curtis,Biology,pp. 377-378 
16See Esper,Analogy and Association in LinguiaticB and Psychology; and Op. 
Cit.,Anttila 
17 See Polya,lnduction and Analogy in Mathematics 
18perrin,Writer's Guide and Index to English,pp. 235-238 
10Sloman, "Intuition and Analogical Reasoning" ,The Computer Revolution in 
Philosophy,pp. 144-176 
200p. Cit.,Ross,pp. 17-19 
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Analogia nominum is a linguistic problem concerning the extent to 
which a word, used in different sentences and which cannot really be said to 
be used equivocally, is used by analogy in the different sentences. Ross's 
hypothesis is that the meaning of a word always depends somewhat on the 
words it is used with, so that univocity in practice never occurs and word 
usage is always seen as either equivocal or analogous, the latter of which in-
cludes metaphor.21 This theory, Ross feels, does not bode well for truth-
conditional semantics,22 or, as the saying goes, - a cat can only be called a 
cat by metaphor. - His view generalizes Wittgenstein's ideas about -family 
resemblance- words like 'game', which, Wittgenstein contended, have no 
unique biconditional to determine their appropriateness in a given context. 23 
Analogia rationis is the problem I am primarily considering. It con-
cerns the question of how an analogy (and here again I am referring to its 
general meaning) achieves its appropriateness. This problem seems more 
general than that of analogia nominum because if one could determine 
theoretically what the use of analogy requires then the answer could presum-
ably be specialized to cover analogous word usage as well as perceptual 
recognition and decisionmaking about new situations. It is for this reason 
that so much recent attention has focused on analogical reasoning in artifi-
cial intelligence research. 
Analogia entis gives analogy the status of a phenomenon that exists 
between real objects or situations. The question of univocal predication, as 
a problem in the analogy of being,24 is not one about whether our words can 
ever be assigned the same meaning in two sentences but is rather a question 
about whether relations and properties are language-independent conceptual 
identities. A central question, and one that is directly relevant to the im-
plementation of analogical reasoning in computers, is whether things which 
we call similar always have a list of common properties which account for 
the similarity or whether their similarity, beyond some point, can no longer 
be analyzed and must itself be expressed as a primitive relation between the 
items. In my theory of analogy I will assume that similarity can always be 
explicated without having just to say, -A is similar to B. - It is not obvious 
that this is justified, however, and this problem in the analogy of being, 
which is perhaps the deepest philosophical issue of the three traditional 
problems of analogy, is discussed further in the conclusion of this essay. 
By understanding analogy as just similarity between non-identical 
situations, I think it should be clear that we have a general notion, of which 
the various restricted definitions of 'analogy' and of some other words are 
special cases. This, I suggest, can eliminate much confusion about the rela-
tion of the ordinary language 'analogy' to the ava),O"f,a sense of the word, as 
well as to 'metaphor', 'simile', and 'model'. All are example types for the 
analogy of situation. Classical, four-term analogies like 
Sun:Earth::Saturn:Titan are analogies in which there are no more than four 
different objects in two pairs, but in which there is an equivalent relation 
between each pair (as opposed to non-classical analogies which may have 
many objects, more than one resemblance of relation, or property equiv-
21 Ibid.,p. 8 
22Ibid.,p .2 
23Wittgenstein,Phil080phical Investigation8,pp. 31-35 
24See Anderson,Reflection8 on the Analogy of Being 
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alences on the parts of some objects). Metaphors are special cases in the 
analogy of meaning, since there is some analogous word usage we would not 
reCer to as metaphorical (like 'plow' as a tool versus 'plow' as an activity25), 
but all metaphorical usage of words is analogous. Likewise, 'simile' and 
'model' can be defined using 'analogy', the former being a case in which A is 
explicitly likened to B in a sentence and the latter being a representation 
which bears a close and useful analogy to the situation that it models. 
The following words also appear to be definable as sub-classes of 
'analogy': 'equivalence', 'equality', 'isomorphism', 'homomorphism', and 
'association'. The following words might be used as synonyms lor 'analogy': 
'likeness', 'comparison', 'similarity', 'resemblance', 'correspondence', 
'closeness', 'parallel', 'relatedness', 'nearness', and 'proximity'. 
The objective of all this discussion about 'analogy' (the word) has been 
to set the right tone for the analysis of analogy (the concept). The conclu-
sions that I hope have emerged are: 
1. Analogy is a very basic concept; its ordinary language meaning is 
fairly easy to define and that deCinition reveals that analogy is 
what is going on in many processes with more specialized names 
(including metaphor and the paronymous 'analog' and 
'analogue'). And, 
2. The original meaning of analogy, A:B::C:D, is outdated except 
for its use on standardized tests. Someone is always trying to 
revive it26 as the "proper" meaning of 'analogy' and even sug-
gest that other uses of 'analogy' are reducible to it. But this ig-
nores the fact that 'analogy' derives from analogia which 
developed by analogy between cr/lcr>'O'1~cr and 1(crpcr6~vwcr. The 
result of that ancient analogy between two concepts was the for-
mation of a very slippery but powerful idea. 
ll. AnaloQia Rationi. and the Problem of the Cogent Quality 
There are three modes of inference which might be considered basic. 
Of these, one (deduction) is sound in that its conclusions are always true 
given the truth of its premises. Another (induction) produces plausible, but 
not sound, conclusions. And finally, a third (abduction) produces conclu-
sions which are hypothetical, suggesting new possibilities.27 This last 
(abduction) is not ordinarily admitted as a part of "logic·, but interest in its 
role in learning and discovery has increased during this century because of 
the work of philosophers of method like Charles Peirce.28 Abduction, in fact, 
appears to be the main rule of inCerence in hypothetico-deductive reasoning, 
in which the hypothesis does not necessarily follow from known inCormation 
but would help to explain that inCormation.29 
25Example from Op. Cit.,Ross,p. 7 
26Se~, Cor example, discussion oC the argument by analogy in Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca,The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation,pp. 371-398 
270p. Cit.,Anttila,pp. 13-16 
28See Peirce,Charles,Philosophical Writings,ed. by Justus Buchler (New York: Dover, 
1955), pp. 129-134 Nt 150-156, cited in Op. Cit.,Anttila,p. 13 
29See Churchland,Matter and Consciousness, p. 71 
6 
The exhaustiveness of deduction, induction, and abduction as basic 
rules of inference can be established in the traditional domain of the syl-
logism. In that domain, a re8ult (. Socrates is a mortal·) is inferred from 
that which is the known ca8e (. Socrates is a man·) by means of a rule (. All 
men are mortals·) which relates the case and result. Symbolically, a 
property Q holds for an individual object A if (a) there is a property P such 
that A has P and (b) Q holds for all individuals x which have P. Formally, 
we have the following: 
Deductive Rule of Inference (The Syllogism) 
Rule P(x)~Q(x) 
Case P{A} 
Result :.Q(A) 
The statements above the line in the syllogism are the premi8e8 and that 
below is the conclu8ion. The syllogism can be generalized to modus ponens 
and ultimately to resolution in order to characterize deduction completely.30 
Induction and abduction can be given this symbolic form when one notices 
that, given the above set of domain objects, there are exactly two other pos-
sibilities for assigning statements to the premises and the conclusion, namely: 
Induction 
Case P(A) 
Result Q1Al 
Rule :.P(x)~Q(x) 
and 
ABDUCTION 
Result Q(A) 
Rule P(x)~Q(x) 
Case :.P(A) 
Now the question remains, given that conclusions based on deduction 
are always logically valid and those of the other two modes never are, under 
what circumstances, if any, should we believe conclusions based on induction 
or abduction? The conventional answer for the case of induction is that the 
inference of the rule is more powerful the more sets of individuals there are, 
without any counterexamples, for which the case and result hold true. Thus 
if n individuals A1, ... ,An are confirming instances of P(x)~Q(x) where P(Ai) 
and Q(Ai) are the case and result, respectively, then we have the enumera-
tive induction, 
premises 
P (Ai) I\Q(A1) 
P (A2) I\Q (A2) 
P (An) I\Q (An) 
conclusion :.P (x) ~Q ex) 
30Geneseretb and Nilsson,Fundamentals or Artificial Intelligence,Cb. 6,pp. 3-5 
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The conclusion thus becomes more probable as n approaches the number of 
values which x could take on. 
There are problems with this criterion as a test for any given induc-
tion. Our judgment about whether the conclusion holds depends on back-
ground knowledge about the projectibility of the property Q for which we 
are trying to make a rule. Nelson Goodman's famous example of a non-
projectible property is 'grue', which is defined as applying to all emeralds ex-
amined thus far which are green, as well as to all thus far unexamined 
emeralds which are blue. Since, in reality, emeralds are green, all examined 
emeralds (a large number) are ·grue M also. So if, by induction, we conclude 
that all emeralds are grue then we expect emeralds examined tomorrow to 
be blue.31 Clearly this makes no sense. Grue is not a projectible property. I 
introduce this example now because I will refer to it in section N in con-
sidering the difference between analogy and enumerative induction. 
Abduction, one might say, is made more believable the more properties 
of the individual A are explained by the inferred property. So in the more 
general form for abduction, 
Q1 (A) AQ2 (A) A ... A~ (A) 
premises P ex) ::::}Ql (x) A ... AQ. (x) 
.'.P (A). 
attributing property P to A might be more acceptable as the number m of 
properties explained by the conclusion approaches the total number of A's 
properties. This seems to me highly suspect as a general rule, since one can 
always invent an infinite number of properties for any object which are en-
tailed by P(x), but the notion has some intuitive value, perhaps. The ques-
tion of its justification is related to the M strength of similarity· justification 
for analogical inference discussed later in this section. 
Having discussed these three modes of inference, we might well ask 
how analogical reasoning fits into this framework. As a first stab, one might 
assert that analogy is represented by the following, where A and Bare 
separate individuals: 
P (A) AQ (A) 
premises P (B) 
conclusion ... Q(B) 
It should be noticed that this reduces to a two-step process in our 
framework, namely 
peA) 
QJ& 
(l)induction P(x)::::}Q(x) 
PCB) 
(2)deduction Q(B) 
31Goodmsn,Fact, Fiction, and Forecaat,pp. 72-83 
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But this simple conception of annlogy as the inference of a property for an 
ind ividual by syllogism from a single-instance generalization seems inade-
quate when we apply the induction criterion. Suppose that Q is projectible 
and that we use the number of confi rmi ng instances, given tbat no con-
tra.diding ones are known , as a guide to the plausibili ty of the analogy. 
Well , there is only olle con firming instance out of perh aps many possible in-
dividuals over wbich x could range, so the criteria for inductive plausibility 
seem to give us a rather low probability for O Uf genera1itatioll-syllogism. 
The problem with this verdict on the plausibility of Q(B) is that it 
does not jibe with the high degree of plausibility that is attached by humans 
to some arguments from analogy. Such &rgumeni.lJ have & qualit.y 01 
cogency which goes heyond the plausibilit.y ot a single instance induction. 
An example should help to illustrate this. Suppose you are an American stu-
dent in Berlin. Yesterday, you went into East Berlin for some touring, and 
when you entered at Checkpoint C harlie, the border guard stamped your 
passport with a day visa. Now here you are tbe next day , at Cbeckpoint 
Charlie, getting ready to enter East Germany again and the border guard 
asks for your passport. You reason by analogy that she too will stamp your 
passport, just as the border guard did yesterday. Th is seems like a cogent 
analogy--you r prediction is likely to be accurate. But now suppose you are 
that same student traveler boarding a bus in Patras bound for Athens. T he 
first people you notice on the bus are two girls speaking to each ot.her in 
Italian. You spot two more people as you meander down the aisle, so per-
haps you should infer by analogy that they too are Italian. This seems not 
to be a cogent inference by analogy. You are, arter all, in Greece, not Italy , 
so you would expect most of those on the bus to be Greeks, or perhaps, Crom 
your experiences elsewhere in Europe, Americans. But according to the in-
duction criteria, it should be at least as plausible that the next people you 
see on the bus will be Ilalians as that today's East German border guard will 
stamp your passport like yesterday 's did . In the bus example you have not 
j ust one but two confirming instances, and the properties 01 being ItaliAn 
Md of stamping passports are bot.h projectible proper ties. H, for instance, in 
Greeee you go on to find that the next fi ve or ten people you see on the bus 
are Italian then induct.ion starts doing its work , and when two teenagers on 
the bus begin pointing at you and laughing as more Italians board t.he bus, 
you are not. surprised when an Italian woman comes over to you and says 
that you have mistakenly board ed a private, It.alian tou r bus. So an 
en umerative induction leads one to conclude, as the number of Italians gets 
larger, that all others on the bus arc Italian just as An increased number of 
experiences at Checkpoint Cbarlie wou ld engrain the belief that all East 
German border guards stamp passports. 
Clearly there is a Ia.ctor in our cogency evaluation tor analogies with a 
small number of connrming instances which goes beyond both that number 
and whether or not the properties being inferred are non-projectible like 
-grue· . Furtbermore, it is this factor which must account for the difference 
between good analogies and bad ones when both cite only a single instance 
'to support the conclusion. One cand idate that has been proposed for this 
extra ractor is the degree-of- similarity between the con firming individual and 
the one for which we are trying to infer a property by analogy. If two in-
dividuo.Js A and B share properties P I'" .,P p and A also has property Q then 
by analogy we inler, in t.his formulation , that B also has Q. The rule of in-
ference now looks like: 
g 
P 1 (A) I\P 2 (A) 1\ . .. I\P p (A) I\Q (A) 
premises P 1 (B) I\P Q (B) 1\ . .. I\F p (B) 
conclusion ... Q (B) 
But if our method for evaluating cogency involves asking how similar A and 
B are then we have moved away from enumerative induction, for whether 
Q(B) can be concluded does not just depend on how probable the generaliza-
tion -P l(x)I\ ... I\P p(x)=}Q(x)- is from a single example but really depends on 
how many properties are shared by A and B and on whether any dis-
similarities between A and B make the analogy a poor one. In this formula-
tion, analogy is possibly a separate type of inference from enumerative in-
duction. Jennifer Trusted posits that induction involves the citing of a large 
number of confirming in8tance8 to support the inference that new cases 
will resemble these confirming instances. But analogy, for Trusted, cites a 
large number of 8imilaritie8 of a case with one or a few other instances in 
order to infer that the case is also similar to the analogous instance(s) in 
other respects.32 
There a,re problems with this view of analogy also. A given individual 
may havll virtually an infinite number of properties, loosely defined, in com-
mon with another. We want to say that some similarities are more impor-
tant than others and that cogent analogy requires a large number of essen-
tial similarities, and no essential dissimilarities, between individuals.33 To go 
a step further, we might say that it doesn't really matter how many 
similarities two individuals have, only that the similarities they do have 
should be enough to imply the existence of the inferred property. So per-
haps cogent analogies are really deductive in character rather than induc-
tive: the analogy helps us to verify that a set E of B's properties do in fact 
imply that B has property Q. Since we find E to be held by A also and that 
A has property Q we hypothesize that B has Q, and the conclusion is valid if 
Q follows from E combined with one's beliefs. 
This deductive explanation seems to reduce the analogous case to the 
role of generating hypotheses. One may agree with this but hold that what 
people really do in accepting conclusions by analogy is to take a leap of 
faith; that analogies can be cogent without their conclusions logically follow-
ing from one's beliefs. Such a person might hold that analogies are 
primarily abductive: their conclusions are accepted (a) if the conclusions are 
consistent with the properties of the individual or situation which they are 
about, and (b) if the conclusions help to explain those properties. But if 
analogy is abductive then we have no method for weighing its hypotheses 
against other hypotheses which would also explain an individual's properties. 
We can take the argument by analogy for other minds as an example. 1 
have privileged access to only one mind -- my own. 1 know to what 1 am 
referring when 1 say that I see green or that 1 have a pain in my leg. For 
. any given person I can infer by analogy when that person says -I see green-
or -I have a pain in my leg- that it is for him or her the same sensation that 
I have when 1 say those things. But these statements on the part of another 
are also explained by all kinds of alternative hypotheses ranging from solip-
sism to inverted spectrums and wicked conspirators. These alternative 
32Trusted,The Logic of Scientific Inference,pp. 8-14 
33Fearnside,About 1'hinking,p. 266, takes this view 
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hypotheses all have one thing in common: they each posit some Cundamental 
difference between what it is like to have privileged access to another mind 
and what my own mental experience is. The argument that other minds a.re 
like mine is based on a real case -- my mind , and I thereby put more prob-
abili ty on the conclusion based on analogy tha.n I do Cor any other randomly 
chosen, though equally explanatory , hypot.hesis. But the abduction prin-
ciples just do not a.ccount for this difference between the plausibility of the 
analogy versus the plausibility of, say, an inverted spectrum hypothesis. 
One way to account for the greater plausibility of the argument based 
on analogy would be to say that there is no logical explanation ;for why 
people choose to believe the conclusion by analogy -- logically, it is lio better 
than any of the other hypotheses. Instead, such a person would argue, the 
cogency of the argument by analogy can only be accounted Cor by a 
psychological explanation. What causes people to accept analogies, by such 
a theory, is an irreducible habit of associating ideas in a way which, through 
instinct or motivation, helps people to interact with their environment and 
to fulfill their human drives. On the other hand, analogies seem to function 
. well even at the highest level of rational debate. Extremely intelligent 
people use analogies and are convinced by them, and the position that 
analogies which are considered by a person to be cogent do not have a logi-
cal fonn that incorporates that person's beliefs, is probably question-begging. 
So I propose that psychological explanation should be considered only as a 
last re~ol"L if no logical form adequate to describe analogy can be found. 
The argument that inspired me to write this essay was Judith 
Thomson's Camous analogy for abortion in cases of rape. She assumes, for 
this argument, that a fetus is in fact a person and therefore has a "right to 
life" equivalent to that of an adult. The argument concerns whether it is 
morally permissible for a woman to abort the fetus given that she has be-
come pregnant despite having no intention to risk pregnancy, i.e. when she 
has been raped. I want to call this situation the central case since it is the 
one about which we are trying to decide. Thomson wants to argue that the 
woman should be allowed to abort in this case. Her argument cites the fol-
lowing analogous case: 
"You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in 
bed with an unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious violinist. 
He has been found to have a kidney ailment, and the Society oC 
Music Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records and 
found that you alone have the right blood type to help. They 
have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist's cir-
culatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can 
be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. 
The director of the hospital now tells you, 'Look, we're sorry the 
Society of Music Lovers did this to you -- we would never have 
permitted it if we had known. But still, they did it, and the 
violinist now is plugged into you. To unplug you would be to kill 
him. But never mind, it's only for nine months. By then he will 
have recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged 
from you .,·34 
Thomson asserts that most people would find it outrageous to require 
anyone to remain hooked up to the violinist, particularly for a long period. 
34Thomson," A Derense or Abortion· ,Philosophy and Public Affairs,!,pp. 48-49; This 
was discussed in Jean Roherts' rail 1983 course at Stanrord on "Ethical Theories", in which 
I was enrolled . 
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She uses this intuition to argue that, even granting that the fetus has right 
to life, that right does not supersede a woman's right to decide what hap-
pens in and to her body. Prior to reading the argument I was sure that 
whether abortion is permissible hinges on whether the fetus has a right to 
life. After reading it I brooded about how the analogous case could possibly 
be relevant in helping one to decide whether abortion is permissible in the 
central case, given that the fetus has a right to life. Although I felt that the 
right to abortion could be justified Cor other reasons, my intuition before the 
analogy told me that abortion just cannot be permitted if the right to life is 
granted to the fetus. Yet I agreed with Thomson that a person should be al-
lowed to be disconnected from the violinist, and my intuition aCter the anal-
ogy was confused. 
I wanted to know, before buying the argument, whether there could be 
any logical basis for changing my position based on the analogy, or whether 
in succumbing I would merely be falling prey to a clever trick of intuition. 
Would agreeing that the analogy is apt mean that my view of the central 
case had been blurred or poorly thought through? Or would it mean that I 
had bought a straw man which jettisoned exactly those parts of the central 
case that would make direct argument for abortion hard to support given 
the right to life? If I analyzed those aspects of the analogous case which 
were unparallel to the central case, would I find therein the crucial dif-
ference which would account for why the analogous conclusion seemed easy 
to support while the central one did not? If I could not find the relevant dis-
analogy would I have enough reason to buy the argument? And finally, 
would analogies have any use at all if people were completely logical, like 
computers, or would analogies then be unnecessary because all the right con-
clusions could be reached by implication? 
I cannot claim to have found complete answers to all of these questions 
in the past year and a half. They have been reformulated and I have 
learned some fairly interesting facts about logic. But I have concentrated on 
answering one question in particular which the other questions all seem to be 
circling around, namely, why would any rational person ever be convinced 
by an argument from analogy? Perhaps no one should be convinced by 
them, but then how do I account for the fact that people have this intuitive 
abiliti5 to tell the diCCerence between what they regard as good and bad 
analogies?36 
Relative to other philosophical problems like induction and the anal-
ogy of meaning there have been few theories proposed to answer this ques-
tion. Despite finding a fair number of journal articles on the subject I am 
aware of no Cull-length books in English devoted to this problem as a general 
phenomenon, and only a few which focus on analogy in limited domains like 
theology or science. The recent upsurge in artificial intelligence research 
into analogical reasoning37 makes examination of the basic issues important, 
especially if a reappraisal of the assumptions underlying current formalisms 
suggests new approaches to the unsolved problems. 
351 don't mean by "intuitive ability" that the ability cannot involve reason, only that 
how this reasoning or judgment works does not have to be explainable by those who use it 
36This formulation of the question is due to my thesis advisor at Stanford, John Perry 
37 Russ Greiner and Stuart Russell at Stanford were both writing doctoral theses on 
analogical reasoning as 1 worked on this essay; and Keith Bellairs at Minnesota, Smadar 
Kedar-Cabelli at Rutgers, and Kevin Ashley at Massachusetts were all graduate students 
working on analogical reasoning formalisms for legal expert systems 
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In searching for a theory of analogy, it makes sense to ask what we are 
looking for. More specifically, what should one require of a theory of anal-
ogy? I suggest that a complete theory would give solid answers to questions 
about. analogy's form, its place in logic, its justification, soundness, limita-
tions, purpose, methods for its use, and its nature as a mental activity. 
What follows is an outline oC these questions: 
1. Form. A theory of analogy should first tell us what analogy i8 
and whether the sense of 'analogy' as a type of reasoning really 
denotes a clear set of phenomena. So one might ask: What is 
analogy? Is it one type of inference or more than one distinct 
type? How can its structure be expressed symbolically? Is there 
a real diCCerence between traditional rhetoric's literal (direct 
resemblance) analogies and figurative (more metaphorical) 
analogies, or is it just a matter of degree? 
2. Logic. The theory should indicate the place of analogy among 
types of inference. Some questions would be: What relationships 
does analogy have to deduction, induction, and abduction! Is it 
reducible to any or a combination of them? What is analogy's 
inferential power relative to that of other modes of reasoning? 
3. Justification. A theory of analogy should answer whether one 
ought to believe arguments by analogy, and if so under what cir-
cumstances. Questions connected with this are: What, if any-
thing, makes a cogent analogy? What are the roles of considera-
tions like the degree of similarity between cases, the degree of 
dissimilarity, number of analogous cases called on for support, 
strength and amount of detail in the conclusion, explanatory 
power of the conclusion, and background information! 
4. Soundness. The theory should take a position on whether con-
clusions reached by analogy can ever be logically valid, or, if not, 
what their logical status is. Questions include: Do analogies 
have any place in sound reasoning? Are they always dispensable 
and redundant in making deductive conclusions! Can the 
analogous case ever be said to prove anything? Or is analogy 
never more than plausible? Never more than suggestive! A com-
plete sham? 
5. Limitations. The theory should give us a way to critically 
evaluate analogical inferences and to detect bad ones. Some 
questions would be: What makes a poor analogy? A misleading 
one? In bad analogies is the disanalogy always what makes the 
analogy fail? Or can it fail for other reasons!38 
6. Purpose. Related to answering why and whether people should 
be convinced by analogies, one would want to know why an ar-
guer would want to use them. One might ask: Why do people 
invoke analogies in arguments instead of applying reasoning to 
the central case? Would any valid conclusions not always emerge 
if they just did the latter? Does analogical argument always con-
tain an implicit generalization? Is it always either a straw man 
argument or unnecessary? 
7. Methods. A theory of analogy, to be useful, should indicate how 
38professor Urmson suggested to me that if one is unconvinced by an analogy, it may 
not be that one's reasoning is clouded or that the disanalogy is to blame, but may instead 
sometimes be that the similarities are just unimpressive 
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one should go about finding good analogies, if such exist. Ques-
tions include: Is it best, in drawing an analogy, to make the 
analogous case as similar as possible to the central case? What 
types of situation, given a central case, make good analogous 
cases? Which don't? And, finally, 
8. Nature. The theory should take a position on the status of anal-
ogy in the Kantian debate over whether certain modes of reason-
ing are intuitive and non-logical or whether any useful inference 
must have a logical structure.39 Analogy would seem to be a 
good candidate for an intuitive mode, so if it can be shown to be 
logical then that should have some impact on the debate. Some 
questions are: Can analogies that are cogent to humans all be 
evaluated computationally? Symbolically (digitally)? Is analogy 
an intuitive mode of inference that cannot be fully explained in 
logic? How do we account for genuine differences of opinion be-
tween people concerning the cogency of a given analogy? Is 
there an element of randomness in the evaluation? 
In reviewing the literature on analogy as a logical problem I have dis-
covered that the first four of the above considerations seem to be of prime 
importance for distinguishing different theories, while the latter four are 
very roughly dictated by the positions that a theory takes on the first four. 
The way in which theories of analogy work appears to be the following: a 
characteristic logical form for analogy is postulated and is seen to cor-
respond either with one of the three basic modes of inference or with none of 
them. The standards for what make that form or mode a cogent form of ar-
gument are then assumed to hold for analogy, and the theory states under 
what conditions analogies are sound, or plausible, or suggestive. The status 
of analogy as intuition or reason usually follows from the above considera-
tions, and the theorist may make comments about when, how, and why 
analogy should be invoked. 
Most theories of analogy are in the spirit of one out of five possible ac-
counts for analogical inference which I want to label: logical necessity, in-
ductive generalization, abductive hypothesis, strength of similarity, and 
psychological explanation. In reviewing and testing ideas about analogy that 
have cropped up at various points in the history of thought, it is good to 
bear in mind that those who have written about analogy have sometimes en-
visaged fields of application more narrow, and uses of analogy more specific, 
than I am considering in this essay. What follows is an analysis of the sides 
which philosophers and others seem to have taken in this debate, but there 
is no reference list of ·-isms· onto which writers about the analogy of reason 
have projected their ideas. People have explored various aspects of analogy 
and have often considered only arguments used in science or ethics, or 
religion or oratory; full articulations of general theories about what makes a 
good analogy are scarce relative to theories about what types of analogies 
there are. Nonetheless, each of those who have written about analogy seems 
to have chosen a set of assumptions which characterize one of the theories 
presented here. I will therefore be careful not to misrepresent ideas 
espoused by a given writer on, say, science analogies, as constituting that 
writer's view about analogy in general. I am aware that people often dislike 
having someone else put their ideas into categories, but hope that the follow-
ing classification reveals, with some benefit, the traditions within which 
philosophers and others who study cognitive activity have been working. 
390p. Cit.,Sloman,p. 144 
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Theories Based on Logical Necessity 
The first inclination one might have in trying to explain why we judge 
conclusions based on analogy to be good or bad might be to conjecture that 
cogent analogy must entail some form of deduction. Under strong logical 
necessity theories, an analogical argument or inference is judged cogent if 
and only if the conclusion is provable from one's knowledge and beliefs. In 
weaker forms of this position, the conclusion may be judged as cogent to the 
extent that it is either given a specific, nOD-zero probability or implied by 
default rules. So a deductivist might .hold, Cor instance, that what has hap-
pened when we are convinced by an analogy is that a set of inferences 
rapidly calculated in our heads has confirmed the truth of the conclusion, 
and the function of the analogous case has just been to let us identify a pos-
sible theorem or default inference before we prove it to ourselves. 
This descriptive view would hold that logical deduction adequately 
describes how people really, actually are convinced. But I know of no au-
thor who has sincerely advocated it. Instead, one might hold the deductivist 
viewpoint only normatively, proposing that a conclusion Q from analogy 
should be accepted only when it is logically implied from (a) the data base 4 
of believed propositions and (b) the set of facts e which are shared by the 
central and analogous cases, B and A Actually, no philosopher r know of 
has quite embraced this normative view either, but a few have suggested a 
validity demarcation for analogies in science. Ernest Nagel gives examples 
from science in which certain physical problems of one type, like heat con-
duction, can be solved in lieu of analogous problems in another domain, like 
gravitation, to yield perfect predictions.40 Although Nagel feels it is impos-
sible to know in advance whether a model (and hence an analogy) will work 
for a given domain,41 he suggests that if identity of logical structure is 
shown to hold then its predictions are valid, and this is the criterion for a 
useful analogy as opposed to an analogy which is an ·obstacle to fruitful 
development .• 42 Nagel's more general view in his writing with Morris 
R. Cohen is that the validity of a conclusion from analogy depends on a 
generalization being true, and as such requires fair sampling and an absence 
of counter-examples.43 This is the view that I will call analogy as ·inductive 
generalization· (see ·Theories Based on Inductive Generalization·). 
R. O. Anderson argues that one should distinguish between 
·conclusive· analogical arguments and those which are merely plausible.44 
In particular, conclusive results are obtained when there is a logical isomor-
phism between two ·different representations of a field-. By this is meant, 
for instance, using predicate calculus as an • analogy· to electronic circuits. 
So on this view, the conclusion Q is either logically implied by the shared 
formal structure between B and A or it is not • conclusive· . But if this is 
40Nagel,The Structure of Science,p. 109 
4IIbid ., pp. 11&-116 
42Ibid .,p. 116; Nagel is cited and interpreted in Achinstein, "Models, Analogies and 
Theories" ,Philosophy of Science,31,pp . 329-330. 
43Cohen and Nagel,An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method,pp. 286-288 
44 Anderson," Conclusive 
Phil080phie,23,pp. 44-57 
Analogical Argument" ,Revue Internationale de 
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the logical foundation for reasoning by analogy then sound analogical 
reasoning seems to require that the analogous case A be redundant in deter-
mining whether Q should be inferred for the central case B. For if one's set 
of beliefs ..1 and the set of shared properties E logically imply Q then ..1 and 
all of the propositions true about B also logically imply Q, given consistency, 
and one does not need to examine A or construct the set E. 
One who holds to the view that convincing (as opposed to merely 
plausible) analogies are verified by deductions independent of knowledge 
about A could point out that this would not make analogy useless. Descrip-
tively, such a person might argue that logical implication is just a check for 
validity and that it may be more efficient or convenient for people to look at 
the analogous case A to see whether Q is true of B. But if a validity check is 
the only way in which one can conclude Q(B) with confidence then one is 
limited to what can be derived from present knowledge and can never infer 
Q(B) if it is not decidable from..1. This seems to undercut the whole pur-
pose for using analogy which should be to give one a way to infer Q(B) when 
..1 and the known facts about B are logically incomplete. 
For analogy to have this useful place in logic, it needs to be shown 
that analogical inferences can be valid when the conclusion is not decidable 
from ..1 and E. This requires (a) that Q(B) be a sound conclusion given ..1, 
the facts E shared by A and B, and the fact that Q is true of A, and (b) that 
A should not be logically unnecessary to the proof. Such a set of cir-
cumstances can in fact exist. This is proven in part ill of this essay for two 
types of premises, one of which was suggested last year by Julian 
S. Weitzenfeld45 and the other of which supports the need for clauses 
having truth value variables. In general, conclusions by analogy follow 
soundly from the belief that two or more cases share properties which are 
adequate to determine whether or not Q obtains. So if A has Q being true, 
and !2 is such a -determining structure- 46 and is a subset of the conjunction 
of shared predicates E, then by analogy one can infer Q(B). However, there 
are substantial reasons to doubt that this is the end of the story about anal-
ogy. 
Weitzenfeld asserts that, since - the schema for reasoning by analogy is 
valid -, the uncertainty in analogy is accounted for by uncertainties in the 
-tacit premise- that Q belongs to a determining structure.47 But this does 
not seem to account for how people often use analogies. In particular, the 
argument for other minds is not explained under such a theory because the 
whole problem is that a person's actions are not enough to tell whether she 
or he has a mind. The analogy seems very convincing nonetheless. 48 It is 
not just that determination is uncertain in this case - I know that the 
similarities between others and myself do not determine the presence of a 
mind in others. So it looks like we will have to continue searching for jus-
tifications for analogy, turning now to a very old form of account. 
45Weitzenreld, ·Valid Reasoning by Analogy· ,Philosophy of Science,51,pp. 137-149 
46Th is is Weitzenfeld's term, Ibid.,p. 141 
47Ibid .,p.139 
481n Human Knowledge and Its LimitB,p. 482, Bertrand Russell asserts that skepticism 
on the part of philosophers· is proressional rather than sincere.· 
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Theorie8 Ba8ed on Inductive Generalization 
It is orteu asserted that analogical arguments ill practice are Dot 
deductively valid but are at most a form of plausible inJerence. One way to 
make this point is to note that. the logical form of analogy col1a,pses into 
single-instance, enumerative induction. Aristotle, in the first analysis of ar-
guments by analogy, saw -rhetorica.l induction- (or -argument by 
paradigm-) as the two-step inductive/deductive process discussed earlier in 
this sectioD.49 Its truth, then, depends on an -incomplete- induction50 -- a 
universal sta.tement made, in Aristotle's terms, without examining aU the 
hown cases in which it could apply. The assumption, then, is that analogy 
involves a generalization based on one or a few instances, and it should be 
cogent if and only it the generaliza.tion is true, i.e. if the exa:mination of 
other known cases (perhaps every other known case) sharing the antecedent 
does not produce a counter-example, and the consequent is a projectible 
property. 
This is a popular position for those who are very skeptical about the 
value of analogy since, in this account, ana.logy is a weakly-supported induc-
tion and the conclusion is therefore assumed to be less probable than one 
based on many instances. For example, M. C. Beardsley contends tha.t 
there is always a hidden generaliza.tion in an analogy and that the analogy 
can be thrown away when that generalization is made explicit.51 His position 
that analogy can never be a cogent form of argument but is merely a 
plausible one52 takes the hard-nosed Aristotelian view63 and is like other 
- analogy is bogus· theories of analogy which dismiss this form of reasoning 
from any place in logic. The briefly sketched theory or Henry KyburgS4 
claims that analogy is not a primitive but is instead always reducible, oddly 
enough, to 8tati8ticai induction witb a single sample, a view similar to that 
of Cohen and Nagel who hold that inferring the generalization requires fair 
sampling and no counter-examples and is probable, if it passes these tests, in 
proportion to the number of analogues examined.55 Joseph Agassi argues 
that analogies which turn out to be right in scientific prediction are even-
tually turned into generalizations. On his view, ad hoc analogies, like 
-Nerves probably conduct electricity because, like telegraphs, they transmit 
informa.tion -, 0nly suggest possible inferences and would not be judged COD-
vincing by a scientist until the underlying principle finds other support. 56 
49 Aristotle, "Prior Analytics" ,Organon I,ll,xxiv,pp. 515-517 
500p. Cit.,Lloyd,p. 408 
51Beardsley,Thinking Straight,p. 113 
52lbid . 
53 As opposed to Aristotle's more sympathetic view oC analogy in his ruminations about 
likencs~ ill ttll! Topic8--&(!C "Theories Based on Abductive Hypothesis" for accounts in that 
tradition 
54Kyburg,Probability and the Logic 0/ Rational Belie/,pp. 278-279 
550p. Cit.,Cohen and Nagel,pp. 286-288 
56 Agassi, "Discussion: Analogies as Generalizations- ,Phil080phy 0/ Science,ll,pp. 
351-356 
17 
So the accounts which follow what, as we saw earlier, is a very obvious 
two-step breakdown of analogical inference, have generally asserted that 
since analogy is just a weak form of induction, the logical justification for it 
must also be weak, and that when analogies are cogent there must be some 
additional investigation or introspection which bears out the conclusion. As 
was illustrated earlier with the Italian tourist bus and Berlin border guard 
examples, the view that analogy can be explained as enumerative induction 
falls into problems in trying to account for how two separate projectible con-
clusions, confirmed by an equally small number of instances, can differ so 
widely in their apparent levels of cogency. An inductivist might try to 
answer this within the theory of inductive justification by suggesting that in 
evaluating cogency one really is reminded of other generalizations based per-
haps on stronger inductions, and the consistency of these generalizations 
with the analogical conclusion is really what tells one whether to believe it. 
This works as a way to explain why, say, a close physical resemblance in size 
and features between two youngsters does not warrant that, if one is known 
to be named - Skippy -, the other one should be also. 57 Past induction has 
lead us to generalize that similar looking kids probably do not have the same 
first name, so this analogy is rejected. Experience does allow us the conclu-
sion that if one is in grammar school then the other probably is also, since 
generalizations like -Kids of similar sizes are around the same age- support 
the induction. But the theory has a more difficult time explaining the 
cogency of some other arguments. Suppose you are the world's first inter-
planetary traveler, and while in some distant solar system you spot that 
staple of modern philosophy, Putnam's twin earth. Orbiting the planet, you 
are struck by the uncanny resemblance to home -- that same climate, the 
oceans, the mountains, deserts; but you know that you are light years from 
the earth. You reason that there must be living things on this planet, even 
though you cannot see them or any direct evidence that they exist. I sug-
gest that there is no past experience to appeal to here. The conclusion 
seems very plausible, but it just is not founded on any generalizations from 
induction based on more than just the earth.58 Actually, I do not think that 
making the planet an exact twin earth adds to the intuitiveness of this ex-
ample. The example works as well if one imagines spotting a planet with 
oceans and continents and clouds like the earth but with a different 
- geography - -- this is imaginable. Most of us would still conclude some 
probability that the planet has life on it, and the probability would be 
higher than for a planet very dissimilar to the earth. The point about this 
example is that it is a pure analogy, like the argument for other minds and 
the existence of God; in each of these only one instance gives us any positive 
reason for our conclusion (although the other planets in our own solar sys-
tem give us a number of reasons for a negative conclusion in the similar-
planet example). 
In short, while some analogies do seem to be inductive in character as 
opposed to deductive or abductive, if the principle of induction is roughly 
defined to be that confirming instances increase one's confidence in a 
.generalization then this does not seem to be the principle at work in explain-
ing why a single known example can give great confidence in its prediction. 
In induction, one's goal is to seek a large number of confirming instances, 
57 This is based 00 ao example from Professor UrmsoD 
5~xcept, perhaps, for the similarity priociple, whicb I ioveigh agaiost io "Theories 
Based 00 Strength of Similarity" 
18 
and one sacrifices specificity in the reference class common to the instances 
because Olle is looking for a law with a simple antecedent. In analogy, the 
goal is to minimize the :;Icope of the reference class, thereby gaining a power 
which enumerative induction gives up because one is not seeking, in analogy, 
a concise generalization -- the whole point of using analogy may be that a 
generalization would be too bard t.o stat.e. So analogy seems to have its own 
set of problems and advantages which are, respectively, not solved and not 
justified by single-instanc~ induction accounts. 
Theories Ba8ed on Abductive Hypothe8i8 
If an analogy is not primarily based on deduction or induction, perhaps 
it is based on abduction. One might hold that the real function oC most 
analogies is not to prove things, or even to establish their probabilities, but 
instead to suggest possible explanations and propositions which are consis-
tent with the known facts about the central case. In like manner does 
Raimo Anttila take the opinion, in his book on linguistic analogies, that 
analogy • is weaker than induction· and rather • feeds on abduction •. 59 
A similar position underlies both Mary Hesse's t,reatment of ·the logi-
cal problem of analogy·60 and Bertrand Russell's attempt to justiry analogi-
cal arguments.51 Hesse trea.ts the problem of justifying analogies as models 
for suggesting possibilities in science and rejects the idea. that validity or 
even plausibility are required of conclusions based on analogy. Accounting 
for the cogent quality of an allalogy thus requires Olle to show that • given 
the choice between a hypothetical elCplanation based on a model and one 
which is not, it is more reasonable to select the Cormer .• 62 This is the task 
facing an abductivist. For if one's view is that analogies generate scientific 
hypotheses which merely have to be consistent with and to explain the ob-
served facts about a situation then it is not obvious on what grounds such a 
hypothesis should be preferred over others. 
I discussed this problem for the other minds argument earlier in this 
section. Russell's theory for how analogy works, which, I think, is clearly an 
abductive theory, tries to justily the analogical argument for other minds by 
citing the fact that since particular thoughts of mine ca.use particular be-
haviors and that other conceivable causal relationships are not in my ex-
perience, the type I have seem likely to be the only kind which actually 
exist.63 This is equivalent to Hesse's Cirst justification for conclusions based 
on analogy, namely • inductive support.- . According to such attempts at jus-
tification, not only is the rule tha.t my type of thoughts cause behavior valid, 
but also there is at least one iMtance to support the converse, that behavior 
implies that thoughts like the ODes that would explain it in me are its cause 
in another. Ergo, this latter rule is preferable to any other hypothesis which 
may be consistent with a different causal rule but which is not instantiated 
590p. Cit.,Anttila,p. 18 
600p. Cit.,Hesse,pp. 101-129 
610p. Cit.,Russell,pp. 482-486 
620p. Cit.,Hesse,p. 101 
630p. Cit.,Ru88ell,pp. 485-486 
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even once in one's experience.54 
This seems like a dubious argument to me. If I can concoct a model in 
my imagination which supports the hypothesis that it is some other thing 
(like a wicked conspirator) which causes the behavior of others then I see no 
reason why this could not count as an instance in support of the rule that 
behavior in others implies that a conspirator caused it. Likewise, I see no 
reason to think that falsiCiability is a positive reason, as Hesse claims it is,65 
to prefer the hypothesis based on analogy with my own mind, for the 
problem brought on by skeptical arguments is that there seems to be no way 
to check the different hypotheses - they are all equally unfalsifiable. The 
criterion of simplicity, which is the last one suggested by Hesse,66 might give 
one reason to prefer the model of one's own case to one dreamed up because 
it asks us to believe nothing of others more than what we believe of our-
selves. However, why one should prefer simple theories is not a question as 
yet answered in logic, and also that criterion may be a double-edged sword 
for supporters of the argument by analogy for other minds since the analogy 
asks one to believe that others have minds, whereas many forms of skep-
ticism do not ask that one believe anything about others and suggest that 
what we see is an illusion, a phenomenon for which there are other examples 
in our experience. 
So if one holds that analogies are abductive in character then their 
cogency appe:us hard to justify with the tools we have. One can say that 
conclusions are more believable the more aspects of a situation they explain, 
or the fewer there are of other hypotheses which are alternatives to the con-
clusion, but preferring a conclusion based on analogy to another based on an 
alternative view seems unjustified if both conclusions do equally well at ex-
plaining the known facts. The problem is that alternative explanations are 
almost always imaginable, so perhaps abduction is too weak to account Cor 
the cogent quality of some analogies. 
Theories Ba8ed on Strength of Similarity 
If analogy is not Cundamentally based on principles of deduction, induction, 
or abduction then perhaps its justification is simply a principle of analogy it-
self. The most popular traditional account of analogy treats the analogical 
inference as a primitive, axiomatizing the notion that the greater the 
similarity one sees between the analogous and central cases, the more one 
should expect unexamined aspects of the central case to resemble cor-
responding aspects of the analogous case. Under such theories, analogies are 
judged cogent if and only if they pass some threshold test for similarity be-
tween two cases. This test is usually seen as a separate criterion from that 
of enumerative induction, because the latter requires a large number of in-
stances of a similarity (as opposed to a large number of similarities) relative 
to the number possible. 
The idea that similarity is a logical justification for analogy seems to 
have originated in the philosophy of John Stuart Mill. It was he who 
'launched a tradition by declaring what I want to call the • Similarity 
Principle· : 
540p. Cit.,Hesse,pp. 104-106 
65Ibid .,p. 127 
66Ibid . 
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• ... we conclude (and that is all which the argument of analogy 
amounts to) that a fact m, known to be true of A, is more likely to 
be true or B if B agrees with A in some of its properties (even 
though no connection is known to exist between m and those 
properties), than if no resemblance at all could be traced between 
B and any other thing known to possess the attribute m .... There 
can be no doubt that every such resemblance which can be 
pointed out between B and A, affords some degree of probability, 
beyond what would otherwise exist, in favor of the conclusion 
drawn from it. II B resembled A in all its ultimate properties, its 
possessing the attribute m would be a certain y, not a probabilitYi 
8Jld every resemblance which can be shown to exist between them, 
places it by so much nearer to that point .• 67 
The Similarity Principle sounds plausible on first reading (perhaps I should 
call this the seductive theory of analogy) but I think tha.t one oan almost 
completely reject it after close examination. To begin with, the basic idea 
- what John Maynard Keynes calls ·our instinctive principle that likeness 
breeds the expectation of likeness· 58 - is extremely dillicult to justify logi-
cally. Weitzenfeld writes that ·not.hi.p.g, not even an increase in likelihood, 
follows from mere similarity , .69 and 1 am inclined to agree. One could at-
tempt to give a justjfi r,ation based on statistical induction, but it is not clear 
at all that even a majority of cases one encounters would support the prin-
ciple. The main problem for such attempts is an abundance of example 
analogies which violate the Similarity Principle. In some analogies, the 
analogues appear to be. extremely similar and yet we have no confidence in 
the analogy. Furthermore, such situations may exhibit more a priori 
similarity than another pair of situations whose analogy provides a very con-
vincing conclusion. 
Here is an example of such situations. Suppose you are in Palo Alto 
on the day of the annual Big Game between Stanford and Cal. .As a new 
resident in town II.nd not quite sure where the game is being pla.yed, you 
emerge !rom buying some kitchenware at the Town and Country Shopping 
Center. Standing in the parking lot, you notice a gold Honda Civic on EI 
Camino Real with a blond-haired WOlD an in it. She turns toward the Bay-
shore at Embarcadero. Seeing another blond-haired Woman in a gold Honda 
Civic, heading toward you on EI Camino, you reason that she too will turD 
toward the Bayshore. Now this is not a cogent conclusion because what 
type of car one is driving and one's hair and sex are just irrelevant to th e 
direction in which one is going. But there is more similarity between the 
two car-approach situations than there is between two very dissimilar ob-
jects, a. walking man with a ua Berkeley sweatshirt, say, and a. tacky look-
ing car with a 'Go Bears· bumper sticker on it, which also approach the in-
tersection at different times. II the first object turns onto Galvez toward 
Stanford, it is a good bet the second one will. Clearly background 
knowledge is coming into the evaluation despite Mill's assertion that the 
connection between the similar properties and the inferred property is not a 
necessary part of the justification. A defender of similarity-based accounts 
could argue that the man and the tacky looking car are in fact more similar 
670p. Cit.,MilI,p. 394 
68Keynes,A Treatise on Probability,p. 222 
690p. Cit.,Weitzenreld,pp. 137-138 
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than the two Honda Civics with blond women in them because the similarity 
between a UC Berkeley sweatshirt and a ·Go Bears· bumper sticker has a 
very high weight in measuring similarity. But the difference between the 
two analogies appears not to be one merely of degree of similarity but of 
qualitative significance - however many properties the man and the car 
share we can only conclude that they will turn in the same direction because 
we know that Berkeley people would be traveling to the game on this day, 
and people traveling to the same destination tend to turn at the same places. 
Most people would judge the two approaching Civics to be more similar 
than the man and the tacky looking car, even on Big Game day, given no 
information about what purpose the similarity judgment is to serve. The 
evaluation must not only be made relative to the conclusion but must also 
involve some questioning of what real reason one has, beyond their a priori 
similarity, for deciding that two objects will turn at the same place. 
There are also examples to count against the Similarity Principle in 
which two arguments by analogy share the same central and analogous 
cases. For instance, suppose you happen to be in a parking lot full of brand 
new cars -- all the same model, body and color, outside the Ford plant in 
Dearborn, Michigan.70 If you look under the hood of one and find a 2.3 liter 
engine, you might conclude by analogy that the car next to it also has a 2.3 
liter engine. But if you see a wadded up piece of paper in the back seat, you 
probably would not conclude that the next car also has a wadded up piece of 
paper in its back seat. The two analogies rest on the same degree of 
similarity because they are based on the same situations; yet one analogy is 
cogent and the other is not. Strength of similarity just cannot account for 
the difference in cogency because there is no difference in similarity. 
A remarkably large number of writers, though, have followed Mill in 
assuming that strength of similarity and an absence of strong dissimilarity 
must be the keys in determining whether an analogy is any good. Theories 
which express the probability increase for the conclusion based on a specific 
number of known similarities have been developed by Keynes, who argues 
for such a theory based on the uniformity of nature,7l and also by P. R. 
Wilson,72 Hugues Leblanc,73 G. H. von Wright,74 H. W. B. Joseph,75 and a 
host of others working in the tradition of Rudolf Carnap.16 All of this work 
is an attempt to give formulas for how probable an inference is based on the 
number of similarities between the cases and the total number of features 
each one has. The problem is that one can make up an infinite number of 
shared properties for any pair of cases. A property can be anything 
-- distance from a given point in space, having a different number of letters 
than the word 'green', not having another property, and so forth ; and the 
70Tbis example is due to ProCessor Perry 
7l0p. Cit.,Keynes,pp . 222-232 
72Wilson, "On tbe Argument by Analogy" ,Phil080phy 0/ Science,;rr,pp. 34-39 
73Leblanc," A Rationale Cor Analogical Inference" ,Philosophical Studies,20,pp . 29-31 
74\ion Wdght"A Treatise on Induction and Probability,pp. 264-272 
750p. Cit.,Josepb,pp. 532-542 
76See discussion under "Other Tbeories and Hybrid Tbeories" on confirmation tbeory 
approacbes to analogy 
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hope that this can all be reduced to a finite, let alone a manageable, number 
of primitive, - real- properties seems to be wistful. 
It should follow then that attempts to define a threshold test for 
whether two situations are - similar enough - to project any properties one 
may hold onto the other is just not a productive approach to automating the 
kind of analogical reasoning done by humans. However, early work on anal-
ogy in artificial intelligence has for the most part rested on some form of the 
Similarity Principle. Efforts to measure how similar two things are by 
counting equivalent corresponding attributes in a frame (e.g., by Patrick 
Winston77) and at requiring situations to match at a preset threshold (e.g. 
by Jaime Carbone1l7S) were useful investigations that have spawned much 
work, but my feeling is that the way forward is to reject the Similarity Prin-
ciple as a guide to good inference and to use similarity only as a first pass 
indicator of whether two situations might be analogous for the purposes of 
drawing a particular conclusion. 
Theories Ba8ed on Psychological Explanation 
Against theories which see the cogency of analogy as reflecting itself in 
logic, many would argue that convincing analogies can only be explained in 
terms of some extra-logical persuasive factors. For instance, a cognitive dis-
sonance theory of analogy might state that cogent analogies are ones which 
minimize, against the rejection of the analogical inference, the unhappy con-
tradictions in one's beliefs. A behaviorist, on the other hand, might say that 
analogy is a conditioned response made more likely by greater neural as-
sociation between concepts.79 
Psychological explanation does not seem to be needed in order to ex-
plain every analogy, since valid analogies are possible. Nor would one want 
to say that one's being convinced by an analogy can never be the result of 
motivational or non-logical factors, particularly in arguments about ethics or 
God. So the type of account, based on psychology, that would be useful is 
probably one which would demonstrate not only that analogies can be 
psychologically compelling beyond their logical justification (as J. Hospers, 
for one, has claimedso) but that the habit of analogizing is a necessary com-
ponent of intelligence despite the failure of logic to justify such analogies. 
If a psychological account is primarily what is needed in order to ex-
plain why we judge some analogies as good and others as bad then there are 
important consequences for artificial intelligence and cognitive science. The 
debate over whether logic programming and symbol processing are adequate 
approaches both in describing and in creating intelligence is surely a Cas-
77 Winston, "Learning and Reasoning by Analogy" ,communicationB of the Association 
' for Computing Machinery,23,pp. 6S~703 
7SCarbonell,"Derivational Analogy and Its Role in Problem Solving",Proceedings of the 
National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-S3),pp. 64-69 
79For a discussion of psychological theories of persuasion, see Ross,PerBuaBion: Com-
munication and Interper80nal Relations 
80Hospers,.J"An Introduction to Philosophical Analysi8 (Routlege and Kegan 
Paul),1960,p. 355, cited in Op. Cit.,Wilson,p. 34 
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cinating one,81 and I would like to discuss the analogy between computers 
and brains, with which it is connected, in part N of this essay. But for now, 
we can say that it is not known at what level (if any) cognitive processes are 
isomorphic with those governed by the rules of presently-deCined logic, and 
so it may be a mistake to assume that analogies are more than just neural 
phenomena which, like seeing and hearing, have proven beneficial in the 
evolution of humans. 
One who held that the human inclination to accept analogies is just a 
habit of the brain was David Hume. In the Treatise of Human Nature, 
Hume argued that people have a • propension· to be led to opinions like 
those they have formed about other situations when their perceptions of the 
two situations resemble each other.82 Hume seems to be advocating that the 
strength of such resemblance is what accounts for our judgment about 
analogy,83 but of course his associationist account does not attempt to jus-
tify this principle. Instead, what we regard as similar objects of thought are 
just plain, unconnected objects for Hume. That people believe they have 
anything to do with each other is therefore just an ·inexplicable fact· 84 
about how our minds work; it has no justification. 
Hume's idea that people apply analogies to new instances out of the 
force of habit is shared and extended by W. V. Quine and J. S. Ullian, who 
argue that in reasoning by analogy we ·slur over· any generalization and 
that plausibility is achieved by the virtue8 that a belief can have: conser-
vatism, generality, simplicity, refutability, and modesty. They see our 
ability to make good analogical inferences as determined in part by natural 
selection.85 Quine and Ullian do not assert that analogy is a phenomenon 
outside of logical justification and in fact their view has also been likened to 
theories based on inductive generalization.86 
There are some criticisms to be made of those who hold that an extra-
logical explanation for the cogency of analogy is necessary. Firstly, it can be 
pointed out that most such ·theories· are Dot really accounts of analogy at 
all -- many just point in the direction of an account and malign analogical 
arguments for their supposed lack of validity. While one can condemn the 
use of analogy as an ·intuition pump· ,87 the leap to assuming that analogy 
cannot have a justification seems itself unjustified. For instance, one may 
admit that association occurs in some way prior to logic in the mind, but 
this does not mean that a logical account cannot be given for cogent 
analogies. 
In short, if a theory can be constructed Cor how analogy can be jus-
81See Israel,"The Role of Logic in Knowledge Representation",lEEE Computer,October 
1983,pp. 37-41 
82Hume,Treati3e 0/ Human Nature,p. 142 8/; 208-209 
83Laing,David Hume,p. 137, shares this interpretation 
84Laird,Hume'8 Philosophy 0/ Human Nature,pp. 94-95 
85Quine and Ullian,The Web 0/ Belie/,pp. 42-62 
86See Shaw and Ashley," Analogy and Inference" ,Dialogue: Canadian Phil080phical 
Review,XXIl ,p. 423 
87Dennett and Hofstadter,The Mind's J,p. 375 
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tined in logic then it will be useful independent of whether it represents ex-
actly how the mind works. II there are cogent conclusions from analogy 
that cannot be explained by such a theory then demonstrating this with ex-
amples is something the advocates of psychological explanation can shoot 
for . 
Other Theories and Hybrid Theories 
Some recent theories of analogy incorporate aspects of more than one 
of the above types of account and may offer alternative explanations for 
what makes a good analogy. 
In particular, a major philosophical effort in t his century, which is ap-
parently still going on, has been the attempt to incorporate analogical in-
fer ence into confirmation theory, following on the -inductive logic· of 
Rudolf Ca.rnap. In Logical Foundatt:ons of Probability, Carnap defined a 
confirmation function which could give the increase in the probability that a 
conclusion holds for the central case B, given that it holds in the aIlAlogous 
case A.88 This seems to require one to count t he number of properties which 
characterize A, B, and their intersection as well as the number of properties 
which logically entail these sets. I have already remarked that the idea of 
using mellS UIes of similarity based on numbers of properties is a highly ques-
tionable one.SIl Nonetheless, there have been many who have worked on this 
approach, in cluding Peter Achinstein (H)63),90 Carnap (lQ63),gl Hesse 
(1964),g2 Acbinstein again (lQ64),g3 Ilkka Niiniluoto,g4 Wolfgang Spohn,g5 
Domenico Constantini,OO and T. A. F. Kuipers.g7 
The basic idea in the confirmation theory approach is that individuals 
or situations A and B are characterized by conjunctions oC predica.tes ap-
plied to them and tha.t cogency corresponds roughly to confirmation. Con-
firmation in turn corresponds to the probability of the conclusion increasing 
given the analogous case, so that if F 1 is the conjunction of shared predi-
88Carnap,Logical FoundatioM 0/ Probability,pp. 56Q-570 
890p. Cit.,Leblanc,p. 30, says that the issue of how much likelihood increases due to 
shared properties 'is academic, since rules for reckoning how many features a thing has, 
and how many of those features another thing doesn't have, are (to say the least) still 
wanting.' 
9OAchinstein,·Variety and Analogy in Confirmation Theory· ,Philosophy 0/ 
Science,30,pp. 207-221 
glCarnap, 'Discussion: Variety, Analogy, and Periodicity in Inductive Logic' ,Philosophy 
0/ Science,30,pp. 222-227 
92Hesse,' Analogy and Confirmation Theory' ,Philosophy 0/ Science,31,pp. 31Q-327 
g3 Achinstein, 'Models, Analogies, and Theories' ,Philosophy 0/ Science,:ll"pp. 328-350 
94Niiniluoto,'Analogy, Transitivity, and the Confirmation of Tbeories',Application8 0/ 
Inductive Logic,pp. 218-234; and • Analogy and Inductive Logic' ,Erkenntnis,~,pp. 1-34 
95Spohn,' Analogy and Inductive Logic: A Note on Niiniluoto· ,ErkenntniB,~,pp. 35-52 
OOConstantini,' Analogy by Similarity' ,ErkenntniB,20,pp. 103-114 
g7 Kuipers,' Two Types of Inductive Analogy by Similarity' ,ErkenntniB,g,pp. 63-88 
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cates and F 2 is that conjunction conjoined with m other predicates also true 
of A, then 
Pr[F 2(B) I F l(B)/\F 2(A)] > Pr[F 2(B) I F l(B)],IIS 
where the increase in probability comes from some variant of the Similarity 
Principle. In fact, the confirmation theories of analogy are very much like 
traditional strength of similarity theories except that they are part of an 
elaborate inductive calculus. In addition to the objections to similarity 
criteria which I have already stated, I would argue that the above formula is 
violated too often to be a good assumption. One could certainly imagine 
situations in which F 2(A) would give no useful information (recall the two 
similar looking children, one of whom is named ·Skippy·) so that the two 
probabilities would really be equal, but I also think the inequality could go 
the other way -- that the probability of the conclusion given the analogous 
case could be less than its a priori probability. For instance, suppose m=l 
and the property conjoined to F 1 to form F 2 is the property of being ga mil-
lion miles from the sun. Now if A ~ B and A and B are both planets then 
we know that the probability is now zero that B is ga million miles from the 
sun because A has that property and there is only one planet for which it 
holds true. Similarly, suppose two of the people in the crowd at a Stanford 
Debate Club public forum are named • Jones· and the other is named 
• Smith·, and all three of those in the crowd have brown hair. Now given 
that A in the crowd is a Jones and has brown hair and B(~A) in the crowd 
has brown hair, Pr[Jones(B)] is less than it was before we knew that A's 
name was Jones (down to one-half from two-thirds). 
Spohn recently sounded the toll of skepticism about the usefulness of 
inductive logic in exploring analogy.1I9 The problem is that it requires too 
many assumptions (including the Similarity Principle) which are just 
blatantly violated in practice. Some of the work on analogy which has ap-
peared in the last few years has been an attempt to do away with such as-
sumptions and to concentrate on how the projection of properties from the 
analogous case (sometimes called the ·base· or ·source·) to the central case 
(or the • target·) are constrained. Cognitive psychology and artificial intel-
ligence have produced theories based on ·structure mapping· in which the 
projection of properties is often constrained by rules. 1OO 
Theorists of argumentation logic have sometimes adverted to relevance 
as the crucial criterion for inferring a conclusion from similarities with an 
analogous case. That such similarities should be relevant to the conclusion 
has often been stated in logic texts,101 and recently W. H. Shaw and L. R. 
Ashley have suggested that analogical arguments do not rely so much on 
resemblances as on background information about the conditions of 
1180p. Cit.,Niiniluoto,· Analogy and Inductive Logic· ,pp. 6-7; The vertical bar in the 
probability expression means • given that ... •. 
1190p. Cit.,Spohn 
100See Burstein,· A Model of Learning by Incremental Analogical Reasoning and 
Debugging· ,Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence 
(AAAI-83),pp. 45-48; Gentner,·Structure Mapping: A Theoretical Framework for Analogy 
and Similarity· ,Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science 
Society,pp. 13-15, cited in Burstein above; Gick and Holyoak,· Schema Induction and 
Analogical Transfer· .cognitive Psychology,!§.,PP. 1-38 
101See, for example, Copi,lntroduction to Logic,p. 360 
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relevance.102 I think this is the right direction in which to traveJ if one is 
seeking a workable theory of analogy, but there are problems with the pic-
ture of analogy painted by Shaw and Ashley. The disanalogy ca.n be 
relevant to the conclusion, too, and so can fac ts about the central case which 
are not known. Furthermore, Sha.w and Ashley do not define reJevance. 
Perhaps it really jus mea.ns tha.t the conclusion follows from the similarities, 
in which case we are back where we started -- at logical necessity - and the 
analogy looks redundant aga'in. I shall attempt to solve these and other 
problems in the account which follows. 
m. A Situational Theory of Analogy 
Language tells us what there is: Individuals 103 are the subjects and 
objects of our discourse. Relations and properties are what predicate upon 
them. Sentences refer to locations in space and time. They describe situa-
tions and events which mayor may not be real. 
The theory of situations developed by Jon Barwise and John P erryl04 
suggests that these facts about language are not incidentally related to the 
universe that language is about -- they are a natural ontology for it. And if 
we really do see the world the way our language indicates we do, then situa-
tion theory seems like a good framework within which to build a theory of 
analogy because analogies, as nearly as I can tell, are just similarities be-
tween different situations. 
A Summary of the Theory of Situations 
Situation theory provides a convenient, precisely defined terminology 
for describing analogy and similarity. lOS My own experience indicates that, 
once the terms of situation theory are understood, the concepts essential to 
analogical inference are more intuitively understandable in the vocabulary of 
situation theory than are the corresponding concepts in the first order logic 
associated with it. This should become clearer as the presentation unfolds, 
since I will use both situation theory and predicate calculus definitions. But 
because situation theory is relatively new, I need to summarize its basic ter-
minology before proceeding with the theory of analogy. 
The primitives of situation theory are individuals, relations, loca-
tions, and polaritie8. Individuals are real things, like people and bicycles, 
and are represented symbolically by a,b,c, ... . Relations, rn, are n-place 
predicates, with O-ary (situational states), l-ary (properties), and 2-ary 
(binary relations, n=2) being the most important kinds. Locations, I, are 
1020p. Cit.,Shaw and Ashley,p. 430 
103The term 'individuals' as used in philosophy means "individual objects" as opposed to 
. "individual persons" 
l04Barwise and Perry,"A Theory of Situations" (Part B),Situation8 and AttitudeB,pp. 
47-116 
10SI will for the most part stick to the vocabulary of Ibid . (Part B of Situations and 
Attitudes). Perry, Barwise, and a host of others in a working group at the Center for the 
Study of Language and Information at Stanford have revised the theory quite a bit since 
the book came out in lQ83, but the older, more familiar theory seems adequate for my 
purposes. 
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regions of space-time, with the universal location I containing every other 
u 
location. Polarities, i, are Boolean values, 0 or 1. 
A situation-type, s, is an assignment of polarities to a conjunction of 
constituent sequences, 1/, where each 1/ consists of a relation predicating on a 
different number n of individuals, viz: rn,a 1, ... ,an. So an atomic proposition, 
for instance, is a constituent sequence assigned polarity 1 (="yes" or "is the 
case·). For example, a clumsy student having lunch with a professor and 
his wife would be represented as the situation-type 
s:=professor,a;yes 
student-of,~a;yes 
husband-of, a,c; yes 
lating-with, b,a,c; yes 
graceful,b;no. 
A state of affairs or event is a situation-type occurring at a location, 
and a course of events or coe, e, is a set of events occurring in a spacio-
temporal sequence having certain relations between the locations. The coe is 
factual if it accurately describes an actual coe as far as it goes, and is non-
factual if it gets something wrong.106 For example, a factual, though prob-
ably not a complete, description of an actual coe might be 
in e: at I: s 
at I': s' 
temporally-precedes, 1,1'; yes 
where sand s' are situation-types, and I at I: s I is an event. An event-type, 
E, is an abstraction of a coe in which any of the primitives for any event in 
the coe may be indeterminate. Indeterminates are represented by r, II, I, 
and i where these refer, respectively, to any relation, individual, location, or 
polarity instead of denoting a particular one. So, for example, if 
E:=at I: professor,lI;yes 
student-of,b,lI;i 
then e would be of type E and a, b, I, and 1 (="yes") would be anchors for 
II, b, I, and i. Furthermore, E could be viewed as abstracting a coe in which 
II, b, I, and i are replaced (anchored) by a, b, I, and 1. Event-types can be 
and-ed together to form more descriptive event-types (e.g., the event-type E 
and E1 as long as the combined event-type is consistent. The component 
event-types are then each part of the combined one. A schema, S, is an in-
clusive disjunction of event-types {E1, ... ,En }. 
In situation theory, facts about particular objects are represented by 
coes, while events of different types are related by constraints, C. A con-
straint is a rule which tells what one may logically conclude about two 
schemata, e.g. having lunch involves eating it, spilling it , or both: 
E1:=at I: person,II;Yes 
having,a,b;yes 
lunch,b;yes 
1061n Ibid.,pp. 49-51, Barwise and Perry distinguish between ab~tract coes e and real 
coes I, where the former are descriptions within the theory and the latter are the parts of 
tbe world whicb correspond to actual coes; For my purposes, all discussion or situations is 
entirely descriptive. 
28 
~£:=at I: spilling.b;yes 
~9:=at I: eating.b;yes 
C:=at I",: involves'~l,S;y88 
where C is the constraint.107 
The Definition of Analogy 
Having reviewed the parts of situation theory of which I will make use, 
the first task in describing my theory of analogy should probably be to say 
just what analogy corresponds to in situation theory. 
Two coes, which I will henceforth just call ·situations· or ·cases·, are 
similar if they have a shared event-type (i.e., if there is an event-type of 
which they are both type) with determined (all anchored) polarities. I will 
assume that the event-type under discussion contains no relation indeter-
minates, so the requirement that it also have no polarity indeterminates 
means that it will contain at least one literal. l08 The representations of our 
knowledge about the two situations will always fall short of describing 
everything there is to know about the situation, if it is real, so when I write 
of a similarity existing between two cases, I mean a known, or encoded, 
similarity, which is only part of the total similarity between the two real 
situations. 
Analogy also requires that the situations be non-identical, so they must 
either differ in location or there must be an abstracted situation-type which 
is known to be part of one situation and known not to be part of the other. 
The known disanalogy will therefore be a single event-type with indeter-
minate polarities assigned to each constituent sequence which is a ·yes· (1) 
in one situation and a ·no· (0) in the other. If we assume that the real 
situations are correctly described, then these are the abstracted facts which 
are anchored to true in one situation only. Furthermore, if the analogy is to 
be useful to us then there should be another event-type which is anchored in 
the analogous case and undetermined in the central case, onto which we 
want to project at least part of the anchored event-type (the conclusion). 
In the definitions below, the analogous and central cases should be 
taken to mean what is known about the two situations both from their in-
itial descriptions and from any constraints that have been • fired • (invoked) 
to yield new facts about them. 
Definition 1: An analogy exists between a central case ec 
and an analogous case e A iff (i) there is an event-type ~S (the 
similarity), with anchored polarities for all of its constituent se-
quences, such that e A and ec are both of type ~S' and (ii) there is 
an ev('nt typ(' ED (the disanalogy), with indeterminate polarities, 
such that e A and ec anchor ED to opposite polarities for each con-
stituent sequence in ED' 
107Ibid . 
108 A literal is a term from predicate calculus which corresponds to a constituent se-
quence with a specific truth polarity (0 or 1) assigned 
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The non-identity requirement (ii) may be fulfilled by differences in 
location or individuals, or both , in addition to explicit polari ty differences, 
when an opposite polarity is deducible for some anchoring. Thus if Mimi is 
Syd's mother and Bibi is Gus's mother and we know that the two are not 
equal and that each person has only one mother, we can conclude a dis-
similarity for analogue individuals Syd and Gus which says that Mimi is the 
mother in one situation and Bibi is the mother in the other. 
Merely having an analogy does not make an analogical inference pos-
sible. For that, we need to be able to project at least some abstracted facts 
about e A onto ec' Therefore, we have, 
Definition 2: An argument may be made by analogy be-
tween e A and ec iff (i) there is an analogy between e A and ec' and 
(ii) there is an event-type EU (the unknown) such that Eu is com-
pletely anchored in e A (no indeterminates) and is undetermined for 
eC (not completely anchored). The unknown, E(Jl must be of type 
E' (the conclusion), which is the event-type whose anchoring in e A 
is projected onto its undetermined portion in ec' i.e. the indeter-
minates in E' which are unanchored in ec prior to the argument 
become anchored in eC as they are in eA' 
Determination Constraints 
I should now be in a position to tackle the fundamental problem of 
analogy with which this essay is concerned. It may be stated thusly: Given 
an analogy {ec,eA,Es,ED } , a data base A of constraints, and an unknown 
Eu' under what conditions might any part E' of EU be anchored in ec for its 
undetermined parts as it is anchored in e A7 
The problems which need to be solved in answering this question are 
those which arise from the theories considered in part II. Firstly, it should 
not be the case that the justification condition is that the anchored conclu-
sion for ec is provable from A and Es or from A and ec' or even that Es is 
provable from the anchored E' and A, for then one would not need e A ex-
cept perhaps to identify a possible E'. Yet it is not that the conclusion E' 
should be based just on the Cact that it occurs in e A' Cor then any conclusion 
by analogy would be equally good. There should be some test condition, 
other than logical implication, for deciding whether or not the conclusion is 
cogent, and the degree of similarity between e A and eC does not appear, 
from earlier investigations, to be a good candidate. 
Human judgments about the cogency of an analogy seem to center 
around how -relevant- the similarity Es is in deciding whether the conclu-
sion E' holds. Moreover, we may require that Es contain a set oC conditions 
which are more or less exhaustively relevant, or sufficient to decide the ques-
.tion. But how does one test for relevance or whether Es is sufficient to 
determine E'? I propose that we should simply add the relation 
'determines' as a constraint verb like 'involves', and deCine it as follows: 
Definition 3: An event-type E determines an event-type E' 
iff Cor every complete anchoring of the set Jl of unshared indeter-
minates in E (those indeterminates which do not appear in E, 
there is a unique complete anchoring oC the set! of unshared in-
determinates in E' which holds Cor all complete anchorings of the 
set !: of indeterminates which are shared by the two 
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event-types.109 
I think that this definition is correct, but it certainly requires some ex-
plaining. Perhaps the easiest way is with a.n example. Let us assume that 
the make and design of a car and whether or not it is American-made are 
jointly sufficient to determine that car's engine-type and whether or not it is 
fuel efficient. Specifically, we have 
C:=at 'u: determines,E,E';1 
where E:=at I: car,lI;1 
make,G,b;1 
design, G, c; 1 
American,lI; i 1 
and E':=at I: car,G;1 
engine-type,G,d;1 
fuel-efficient,G;i •. 
In this example, the set ~ of shared indeterminates is {I,G}. The set Jl of 
other indeterminates in E is {b,c,i1}, and the set! of other indeterminates in 
E'is {d,'.t}. A complete anchoring for {~,Jl} is a set of values for these in-
determinates, so the definition above simply says that if the determination 
constraint holds and one knows the anchoring for {~,Jl} in a situation, then 
there is only one possible anchoring for ! even though we might not know 
what that anchoring is. A corollary to the definition would be that if E in-
volves E' then E determines E', so the set of ordered pairs of event-types in 
the extension of 'involves' is a subset of those which stand in the relation of 
determination. 
Detail of an Argument by Analogy 
Before defin ing the theory more rigorously, it is probably worthwhile 
to demonstrate exactly how a particular (simple) argument by analogy can 
be constructed using determination. The argument concerns two 
Frenchmen, Pierre and Francois. Last year, Pierre came to the United 
States to become a research associate at Stanford. He was required to get a 
visa from the U.S. Government before he came. This year, his friend Fran-
cois is coming from France to attend Berkeley as a graduate student. Fran-
cois concludes, by analogy, that he too will need a visa. 
Francois's situation is the central ca8e: 
in eC: at France-1986: nationality,Francois,French;1 
visiting,Francois,U.S.;1 
8tudent,Francois;1 
school,Francois,Berkeley;1 
The unknown is whether Francois needs a visa: 
EU:=at France-1986 : needvisa,Francoi8;'1 
The analogou8 case is his friend Pierre's, last year: 
109Tbe 'determines' constraint requires tbat no constituent sequence in E' both contain 
an indeterminate individual and be assigned an indeterminate polarity. Tbis is a tecbnical 
decision wbicb is too complicated to discuss bere but which should not hamper us very 
much if at all. I bave yet to decide whether this assumption is necessary . 
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in eA : at France-19B4: nationality,Pierre,French;1 
visiting,Pierre,U.S.;1 
student,Pierre;O 
school,Pierre,Stanford;1 
needvis&,Pierre;1 
So, between them, the strongest 8imilarity we can state (without firing con-
straints on their respective situations) is: 
~s:=at I: nationality,a,French;1 
visiting,a,U.S.;1 
school,a,";1 
The dis analogy is the set of facts which are true in one situation but not in 
the other: 
~D:=at I: student,a;i~ 
Of course, the actual disanalogy will be virtually infinite, but in the absence 
of further knowledge or information provided by constraints, ED is the full 
provable dissimilarity. The disanalogy only plays a role if the argument is 
not sound, in which case it needs to be enumerated more completely than in 
this exa.mple. 
Now bllppose we know that whether you will need a visa is deter-
mined, in general, by which country you are from and which one you are 
going to. We know the determination con8traint: 
C:=at lu: determinu,E,E'; 1 
where the determinant is: 
E:=at I: nationality,a,c;1 
visiting, a, II; 1 
and the conclu8ion is: 
E':=at I: needvisa,a;i1 . 
To make the argument, we verify that Eu is of type E' and that Es is of 
type E. The sets of shared indeterminates (!:), of unshared indeterminates in 
E (Ji), and of unshared indeterminates in E' (!:), are !:={l,a}, Jt={c,II}, and 
~{i1}' Anchoring the determinant's set Ji to {French,U.S.} as it is 
anchored in E s gives the antecedent: 
E":=at I: nationality, a,French; 1 
visiting,a,U.S.;1 
and anchoring the conclusion event-type's set!: to {I}, as dictated by e A' 
gives the con8equent (or anchored conclusion): 
E"':=at I: needviBa,a;1 
which sets up a new "involves· constraint (the generalization): 
C':=at lu: involveB,E",E"';1 
Since ec is of type Es' and therefore of type E", it must by C' be of type 
E''', so !:, the indeterminates in E"', can be anchored for ec to 
{France-I985,Francois} and we can say 
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in ec: at France-19S6 : ne.dvisa,Francois;y ••. 
This example illustrates the general mechanism of analogical inference 
when determination constraints are known for given similarity and conclu-
sion event-types. One possible criticism of the approach is that we may not 
know any such constraint for a particular analogy. I do not assume that all 
reasoning by analogy entails a deductive application of a determination rule. 
Other forms are discussed later in this section. But it seems to me that 
determination is a very useful form of constraint to be aware of, because it is 
more general than involvement and is often the kind of information we have, 
or ask whether we have. I do not know, for instance, whether Turkish 
people need visas to go to Greece, but I have a feeling that they either all 
need visas or none of them do. Let me talk to a Turk who has been to 
Greece, and I will tell you which one it is. So determinative knowledge 
facilitates learning. From a general rule I can collect new, more specific 
rules as I examine, in the theory's terms, new anchorings for the unshared 
indeterminates in E and E'. Reasoning by analogy in such cases is both 
valid and indispensable. 
Semantics in First Order Logie 
Although situa.tion theory is intended as a framework for a semantics 
of nat·ural n.nd artifi cia.l languages, in this case it seems appropriate to 
reverse roles and give an interpretation of situation theory and determina-
tion constraints in terms of the first order predicate calculus. This will 
facili ta.te the proof of soundness and should help to clarify the exact mean-
ings of some terms. 
The translation initially requires a few more definitions. To set up the 
interpretation of event-types and coes in first order logic, I first define a 
weak notion of truth: 
Definition 4: A set A of anchors (-values-) for each of the 
indeterminates in an event-type E is a factual complete anchoring 
of E iff E is anchored to A (- instantiated -) in some actual coe. 
Event-types and coes can be defined in terms of first order predicate 
schemata: 
Definition 6: A predicate schema110 P(x1, ... ,xn) is an as-
sociated first order expression, or afoe, for an event-type E 
having n indeterminates iff the extension of P is equal to the set of 
all factual complete anchorings of E. 
With the afoe, a predicate calculus interpretation for definition 4 may 
be given: 
Axiom 6: An event-type E with n indeterminates is anchored 
by some actual course of events e (there is an e of type E) irf 
3x1'''''Xn P(x1, .. . ,xn), where P(x1, ... ,xn) is an aCoe for E. Similarly, 
an event type E' is of type E iff an afoe or E' is coextensive with 
an afoe of E anchored for its unshared indeterminates as in E'. 
Intuitively, P can be thought of as the scaffolding of the event-type: all 
the determined relations, locations, individuals, and polarities which appear 
in it, together with their structure. The free variables xl, ... ,xn are the 
110 A predicate schema (not to be conrused with a situation theory schema, as defined 
earlier) is, ror my purposes, a predicate on free variables 
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spaces between scaffolding, and anchors Cor these are the boards and poles 
which are placed in the spaces and thereby become part of the structure. 
The relation of involvement between event-types corresponds to a kind 
of implication: 
Axiom 7: For event-types E and E' with n and m(~n) in-
determinates, respectively, E involves E' iCC \:Ix1,···,x \:IYl' ... 'y m nom 
P(xp ... ,xm,y p ... ,y o-m) =* Q(xp ... ,xm), where P(xl' ... ,y o-m) and 
Q(xl' ... 'xm) are afoes Cor E and E', respectively, and the set 
{xl' ... 'xm} corresponds to the shared indeterminates. 
The relation oC determination may be seen to correspond to a some-
what more complicated expression in logic: 
Axiom 8: For event-types E and E' with np and nQ indeter-
minates, respectively, E determines E' iff \:Ix1,· .. ,x \:IYl' ... 'y m 0p-m 
\:Izl' ... ,zoQ_m P(xl'x2,···,xm,y Py 2'···'y np-m) A 
Q(Xl'X2,···,xm ,zpz2,···,ZoQ_m) =* [V'wl' ... ,wm 
P(w1,···,w 'Yl'···'y ) =* Q(w1,···,w ,zl'···'z )J for afoes m 0p-m m 0Q-m 
P(x1, ... ,y ) and Q(x1,. .. ,z ) of E and E'. op-m· nQ-m 
That involvement is just a special case oC determination may now be 
proven: 
Theorem 0: If E involves E' then E determines E'. 
Proof: Let the number of indeterminates in E and E' equal 
nand m, respectively. Map the set of values xp ... ,xm one-to-one 
onto a range for a new variable x and do a similar mapping Cor 
y l' ... 'y nom onto y. By axiom 7 and the hypothesis, \:Ix,y P(x,y) =* 
Q(x), where P(x,y) and Q(x) are afoes for E and E' and thereCore 
there are no unshared indeterminates in E'. A substitution gives 
\:Iw \:Iy P(w,y) =* Q(w), and by quantifier reversal and implication 
introduction, \:Iy \:Ix P(x,y)AQ(x) =* [V'w P(w,y) =* Q(w)J, which, 
by axiom 8, is the condition Cor determination of event-types Cor 
nQ=O. 
Proof of Soundness 
To prove the soundness of analogical inference under determination, I 
will first prove the situation theory analogue of the rule of the syllogism and 
then prove that an ·involves· constraint can be inferred from a determina-
tion constraint combined with a single coe. The validity of the argument by 
analogy as defined in definition 2 follows Crom the two lemmas. 
Lemma 10: If E involves E' then any actual coe e oC type E 
must also be of type E'. 
Proof: If e is of type E then by axiom 6, 3x,y P(x,y) where 
P(x,y) is an afoe of E with n indeterminates and x and yare col-
lapsed variables with ranges equivalent to those of {xl' ... 'xm} and 
{Yl' ... 'Yn-l}' respectively. By axiom 7, \:Ix,y P(x,y) =* Q(x), where 
Q(x) is an afoe for E', so by universal instantiation and modus 
ponens, Q(A) is an afoe Cor e where A is the complex object cor-
responding to the factual complete anchoring of .!. in e and where e 
is treated as an event-type. Therefore e is of type E'. 
The byproduct of determined arguments by analogy is a new rule in-
ferred as a generalization from a single instance: 
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Lemma 11: If E determines E' and e is of type E and E', 
then there is a pair of event-types E" of type E, and E'" of type 
E', with anchors for each of the np-m and nQ-m indeterminates 
unshared in E and E' and with the same set oC shared indeter-
minates as E and E', respectively, such that e is oC type E" and 
E"', and E" involves E"'. 
Proof: By axiom 8 and the hypothesis, for afoes P(x,y) and 
Q(x,z) of E and E', respectively, where x, y, and z are collapsed as 
before, Vx,y,z P(x,y)/\Q(x,z) =} [Vw P(w,y) =} Q(w,z)J. Let A be 
the anchoring for x, B be the anchoring for y, and C be the 
anchoring for z in e. Then by universal instantiation and modus 
ponens, Vw P(w,B) =} Q(w,C), which may be rewritten as Vw 
P'(w) =} Q'(w), where P and Q have been replaced by primed 
predicates which have extensions equal to the range of w. The im-
plication is a sufficient condition for E" to involve E"', where 
these two event-types have afoes P'(w) and Q'(w). By axiom 6, 
since these are coextensive with P(w,B) and Q(w,C), respectively, 
E" and Em are of types E and E', respectively, and since for e, 
3w P'(w)/\Q'(w), e is of type E" and E'''. 
Finally, the validity of analogical inference can be proven Cormally un-
der the constra.int of determination: 
Theorem 12: Given an analogy {eC,eA,Es,ED } with an un-
known, Ell' which is completely anchored in e A and is oC type E' 
(the conclusion event-type): if there is an event-type E such that 
Es is of type E and E determines E', then the argument by anal-
ogy is sound. 
Proof: From lemma 11, since E determines E' and e A is of 
type Es and EU and thereCore oC type E and E', there are event-
types E" (the antecedent) and E'" (the consequent) which anchor 
the unshared indeterminates in E and E', respectively, as they are 
anchored in e A such that E" involves E"'. E" anchors the un-
shared indeterminates in E to values in ES' which is of type E, so 
Es must also be of type E". Since eC is of type ES' eC is also of 
type E", so by lemma 10, eC must be of type E"'. The anchoring 
of indeterminates as prescribed in definition 2 has been ac-
complished by a deductive procedure. 
Having given a general account of analogy in situation theory, we 
might want to ask how determination rules could be expressed in logic for 
arbitrarily complex expressions, viz when the predicates, constants, and vari-
ables are not collapsed representations of event-types but direct represen-
tations of properties holding or not holding for objects. It is this task to 
which I now turn. 
Solution and Decision 
The determination relation as I have presented it allows assignment of 
location, individual, and polarity indeterminates based on a single constraint 
verb, 'determines'. In traditional predicate logic, however, the fact that 
clauses cannot have variable truth values (there is no argument place Cor 
polarity) means that the effect oC having polarity variables must be achieved 
without actually having them. The allowance for indeterminate polarities 
seems to be an advantage for situation theory in addition to its perspicuous 
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ontology for the various combinations of facts and schemata and for the 
relations between the different forms. But situation theory is a more com-
plicated framework for representing propositions in a data base, and it has 
not yet been fully axiomatized in the manner of first order logic. So it is 
probably worthwhile to try to experiment with determination in the more 
familiar formal language of the predicate calculus, in which it is possible to 
deCine a pair of logical connectives to correspond to individual determina-
tion, in one case, and to polarity determination in the other. 
Individual determination corresponds to what I want to call functional 
determination or solution in predicate calculus. It is this type of determina-
tion which was anticipated by Weitzenfeld111 although he did not define it 
in terms of logical connectives. A new logical operator for functional deter-
mination may be defined as follows: 
Definition 13: A function F solves another function G for 
all x iff'rlx [F(x)=y"G(x)=z] =} ['rIw F(w)=y =} G(w)=z], which 
can also be written as 'rIx 'rIy 'rIz [P(x,y)"Q(x,z)] =} ('rIw P(w,y) =} 
Q(w,z)).1l2 
This, of course, looks very much like the definition of determination 
using afoes, but in this case the variables to be determined are restricted to 
object variables. Suppose, for instance, that we wanted to split up the 
determination constraint defined in the example after definition 3 into two 
parts, namely (a) the make and design of a car determine its engine-type, 
and (b) whether or not a car is American-made determines whether it is fuel-
efficient. The first constraint is a case of functional determination: make 
and design solve for engine-type. The second is an example of what I call 
truth value determination or decision. Its realization in predicate logic is 
Definition 14: A clause with an unknown truth value P1(x) 
decide8 the truth value of another clause Q1(x) iff (['rIx P(x) =} 
Q(x)) V ('rIx P(x) =} -,Q(x)]} " {('rIx -,P(x) =} Q(x)) V [Vx -,P(x) =} 
-,Q(x)]}. I write this as P?(x):>-Q?(x). 
In traditional first order logic, the truth value of a clause (which I will 
henceforth assume to be synonymous with its polarity) cannot itself be a 
variable. Given the set of logical operators in predicate calculus, this makes 
sense because any variable attachment to a predicate's polarity would 
simply make it a tautology (P or not P). Having polarity variables becomes 
useful, however, when we define connectives like 'decides' which allow state-
ments about what one needs to know in order to know other things. 
A number of little theorems can now be proven which make clear how 
these connectives operate. Some of these have been pointed out to me by 
others, as noted. 
Theorem 15: If P(x,y) solves Q(x,y) and there are objects 
A, B, and C such that P(A,B) and Q(A,C), then we can infer the 
functional generalization: 'rIw P(w,B) =} Q(w,C). 
Proof: Follows by syllogism (universal instantiation and 
modus ponens) from definition 13. 
11lOp. Cit.,Weitzenreld,p. 141 
112Tbis formula may look more complicated than one would expect. Unfortunately, 
simpler formulas like ""Ix '!Iy 3z P(x,y) "* Q(x,z)" break down in proors of tbe validity of 
functionally determined conclusions. The conjunctive normal form clause for tbe solution 
sentence is " ..... P(x,y )V ..... Q(x,z )V ..... P(w ,y )VQ(w ,z)" . 
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The above theorem allows inferences like • All Spaniards speak Spanish· 
ITom, for example, the premise that nationality solves Cor native language, 
together with an observed case of a Spaniard whose native language is 
Spanish. 113 
Theorem 161 If P(x) decides whether Q(x) or -,Q(x}, and 
there is a case A such that P(A} and Q(A), then. we can infer the 
truth value generalization: Vx P(x) ~ Q(x). 
Proof: Assume 3x P(x)I\-.Q(x). Definition 14 can be And-
simplifled to IVx P(x) ~ Q(x)]v[Vx P(x) ~ ..... Q(xl] . The assump-
tion eliminates the first disjunct, and the hypothesis that P and Q 
both hold for A eliminates the second disjunct, so by reductio ad 
absurdum the t.heorem is proven. 
This justifies the first step (the generalization) in the two-step Aristotelian 
model of analogy given earlier. The analogous case A serves to eliminate 
one of two possibHities: that. aU P's are Q's or that they are aU not Q's. We 
have this kind of djsjunctive knowledge often. For example, I do not know 
whether history majors at tbe University of Texas are reqillred to take. a 
foreign language, but it seems likely that being a history major at that 
Universi ty determines which it js. 
Theorem 17: P(x,y) solves Q(x,z) iff Vw,x,y,z P(x,y) 1\ 
Q(x,z) 1\ P(w,y) ~ Q(w,z). (Paul Rosenbloom, Stuart Russell) 
Proof: From definition 13, VX,y,z P(x,y) 1\ Q(x,z) ~ IVw 
P(w,y) ~ Q(w,z)l, so taking the ·Vw· outside, Vw,x,y,z P(x,y) 1\ 
Q(x,z) ~ P(w,y) ~ Q(w,z), which can be rewritten as above. 
The above theorem suggests an alternative way to prove the validity oc 
analogy, by instantiating w, x, y, and z to the values in the analogues and 
performing a syllogism. 
Theorem 18: P?(x):>-Q?(x) ~ P(x):>-Q?(x). 
Proof: Follows Crom definition 14 by And-simplification. 
In practice, the test condition Cor analogy will be the consequent in this (the 
above) theorem rather than being the antecedent, since it is known prior to 
the analogy whether P holds for the two analogues. 
Theorem lU: P?(x):>-Q?(x) ¢::> P?(x)-<Q?(x). (Jerry Hobbs) 
Proof: By definition 14., P?(x):>-Q?(x) iff {[Vx P(x) ~ Q(x)] 
V [Vx P(x) ~ ..... Q{x)J} 1\ ([Vx ..... P(x) ~ Q(x)1 V IVx ..... P(x) ~ ., 
Q(x)J} , where the implication.s can be written truth functionally as 
{[Vx ..... P(x) V Q(x)] V [Vx -,P(x) V -,Q(x)J} 1\ {[Vx P(x) V Q(x)] V 
IVA P( ) V -,Q(x)j}, which is the same as the truth func tional fOfm 
for the definition of Q?(x):>-P?(x). 
This points out that definition 14 Cor P?(x):>-Q?(x) would serve equally well 
as a definition Cor Q?(x):>-P?(x). I wrote the definition as a conjunction of 
disjunctions to show the form that oC the general case logical equivalence 
113This example was suggested to me by Stuart Russell 
37 
when the determinant is a conjunction of predicates. If some, but not all, of 
the predicates have determined polarities then the biconditional (mutual) 
determination will not hold -- it is only valid in the simple case in which a.ll 
of the predicates are of variable truth value. 
Theorem 20: F(x) solves G(x) iff Yw,x F(x)=F(w) ~ 
G(x)=G(w). (Stan Rosenschein) 
Proof: By theorem 17, F(x) solves G(x) iff F(x)=y 1\ 
G(x)=z 1\ F(w)=y ~ G(w)=z, which is equivalent to 
F(x)=F(w)I\G(x)=z ~ G(w)=z. Rewriting, F(x)=F(w) ~ 
[G(x)=z ~ G(w)=z], which is true if a.nd only if F(x)=F(w) ~ 
G(x)=G(w). 
In the special case in which the object variables (x and y) range over in-
stants in time, the function F is the state of a system (e.g., a collection of 
particles in space) for one possible history, and the function G is the state 
for another possible history, the above theorem expresses Montague's con-
dition for theories to allow one to deduce, given the instantaneous state of a 
system, its state at any time thereafterY4 
Theorem 21: P(x):>-Q?(x) iff YX,y P(x)I\P(y) ~ [Q(x)<=* 
Q(y)]. (Stan Rosenschein) 
Proof: By definition 14 and And-simplification, P(x):>-Q?(x) 
iff [Yx P(x) ~ Q(x)]V[Yx P(x) ~ -,Q(x)], which has the same con-
junctive normal form as the above expansion: -,P(x) V Q(x) V -, 
P(y) V -,Q(y). 
Theorem 21 provides another definition for decision which is particularly 
well suited to analogical inference. Finally, 
Theorem 22: If P(x):>-Q?(x) and P(A)I\Q(A)I\P(B), then 
Q(B). 
Proof: The premises fulfill the requirement for theorem 16, 
from the consequent of which Q(B) follows by syllogism. 
Theorem 22 completes the proof of soundness for Aristotle's two-step process 
of analogy when P(x) decides Q?(x). 
The connectives 'solves' and 'decides' are useful for describing analogy 
in the simplified domain of the syllogism. It is also possible to reconstruct 
the notion of 'determines' in predicate calculus based on solution and deci-
sion. An event-type may be represented as a conjunction of m clauses 
(m=the number of clauses) where each clause is either a literal (anchored 
polarity) or a. two-proposition disjunction (indeterminate polarity) and in 
which the nth argument of each n-place predicate is the loca.tion referred to 
by the clause. Thus the event-type E defined above would be written 
thusly: 
114Montague,"Deterministic Theories"(Ch. ll),Formal Philo30phll,pp . 303-359; See espe-
cially Montague's discussion of why this sentence "cannot be taken quite literally", pp. 
303-304; There is a large philosophical literature on determinism wbicb I bave not at-
tempted to review, but whicb is not directly relevant to tbis essay. 
Car(a,l) 
I\Make(a,b,l) 
I\Design(a,c,l) 
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1\ [American( a,I)V-.American( a,I)I. 
In general, an event-type with m constituent sequences, of which t have posi-
tive polarities and v have indeterminate polarities, can be represented as 
I\~ 1 P .(a.,11·) 1= 1-1 I 
where !:p hj' and £k are the parametric vectors of individuals predicated 
upon, respectively, by the ith true relation Pp the jth false relation Q j , and 
the kth relation with an undetermined truth value, Rk, and where lIP 12j' 
and 13k are the location pa.rameters for each of these predica.tes.115 
The connectives 'solves' and 'decides' ca.n now be combined in predi-
ca.te logic to form a definition for 'determines': 
Definition 23: A conjunction E116 with m clauses, t of 
which have polarity one and v of which have indeterminate 
polarities, determines a conjunction E' with corresponding 
parameters m' ,t', and v' iff 
(i) For every possible vector of truth value assignments to the 
undetermined clauses R\: 
solves each conjunct in 
and (ii) For every clause R?'k of indeterminate polarity in E', 
Essentially, then, the general case of determination is somewhat 
awkward to express using our new connectives. It might be noted that loca-
tion determination becomes just a special case of functional determination in 
this definition, as long as the location parameter is simply added to each 
predicate in the translation. Furthermore, the predicate calculus represen-
"tation of -E determines E'- is exponential in v and v', and depends on the 
exact form of the definition chosen for 'decides' (i.e., definition 14 or 
theorem 21) 
115Tbe vectors or location parameter may contain constant or variable objects 
116Tbe E without italics means that I am referring to the conjunction whicb represents 
the event-type E 
3Q 
The types of determination that have been defined here (location, in-
dividual, and polarity) do not exhaust the possibilities. A determinative 
operator can be defined for anything which can be variable. While I do not 
see any benefit to relation indeterminates, other logical objects normally 
taken to be absolute could be made into variables. What type oC quantifier 
a variable is bound to could itself be a variable, as could numerical functions 
and entire situations, event-types, or schemata, e.g. in a constraint. Even 
whether-or-not-a-thing-is-a-variable can be a variable. I have especially 
thought about punctuation indeterminates, which might be useful Cor 
describing the chalkboard writing of some professors. 
Types of Situation Similarity 
The similarity event-type Es can range from highly determined and 
specific to very abstract and general. I wish to discuss briefly the different 
types of similarity abstraction and the different levels of event-type involve-
ment. 
Any situation description of the form invented by Barwise and Perry 
can be represented as a conjunction of constituent sequences each assigned 
to a pCllarity and a locat.ion. I want to call these conjuncts situation con-
juncts. They have the general form, 
rn(a 1, ... ,an,lji). 
In the strictest terms, more than one location might be specified (for in-
stance in relations between locations), and n may be zero (when r is a loca-
tional relation or situational state). The abstracted situation conjuncts 
(which I call event-type conjuncts) of the similarity event-type Es may thus 
have different types of indeterminates among the parameters of the predi-
cate rn, as long as all the i's are anchored. For instance, a conjunct in Es 
may be a property anchored to an individual and to a polarity but with an 
indeterminate in the location parameter. This type oC abstraction I call 
-individual equivalence-. 
In general, two situation conjuncts can have the following types of 
similarity, in roughly descending order of strength: individual equivalence, 
locational equivalence, state equivalence, property equivalence, and n-ary 
relational equivalence. 
Individual Equivalence: Two situation conjuncts have individual 
equivalence if the event-type conjunct they share contains no individual in-
determinates. The event-type conjunct in question mayor may not have 
locational equivalence, but in either case individual equivalence is a strong 
type of similarity: a conjunct in Es with this type of similarity indicates that 
a relation is true of the same individual(s) in two different situations. 
Locational Equivalence: Two situation conjuncts have this type of 
similarity if their shared event-type conjunct is anchored to a spacia-
temporal location. At a given place and time, a relation may be true of 
·more than one set of individuals. For instance, here and now, five is greater 
than threl;! and four is greater than two. These two situation conjuncts are 
equivalent relations true at the same location but of different individuals. 
The remaining types of similarity classify abstraction according to the 
arity of the relation predicate in the situation conjuncts. Any similar situa-
tion conjuncts will fulfill exactly one type from among these: 
State Equivalence: Two situation conjuncts have state equivalence if 
they share an event-type conjunct with a O-ary relation predicate. This oc-
curs, for example, when it is raining in both situations, regardless of whether 
the rain is falling at the same location in each situation. 
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Property Equivalence: In this case, the shared event-type conjunct has 
a I-ary relation predicate. The property may hold for different individuals 
at different locations. For example, a red block here has a property equiv-
alence with a red sock there. 
N-ary Rela tional E quivalence: Similarly, two situation conjuncts may 
share a· predicate of arity n, greater than one. Classical analogies are cases 
of binary relational equivalence, for example beak:bird::mouth:human. A 
bird 's beak and a human's mouth .are both food intake features, so a situa-
tion in which a bird has a beak is similar to one in which a human has a 
mouth because the two situations share the binary predicate 'is the food in-
take feature of'. It should be noticed that the situation conjuncts retain 
their relational (state, property, or n-ary) equivalence even if they have loca-
tional and/or individual equivalence as well. 
These, then, are the types of equivalence which two situation con-
juncts can have. The event-type conjuncts in Es' which are shared by situa-
tion conjuncts in eo and e A' are each anchored to a specific relation and 
polarity. Some of them may also be anchored to individuals and locations. 
We may define three grades of similarity for each type of equivalence: 
- total-, -partial-, and -no - . 
Total (type) Equivalence: The similarity Es has the total grade of a 
type of equivalence (location ai, individual, etc.) if every event-type conjunct 
in Es has that type of equivalence. 
Partial (type) Equivalence: If only some of the conjuncts in Es have a 
particular type of equivalence, then the situations have that type only par-
tially. 
No (type) Equivalence: Two situations (or the shared event-type) have 
a type of equivalence not at all if none of their shared event-type conjuncts 
have that type. 
Some pairs of situations, then, will be similar only by relational equiv-
alence and will have no similarities for individuals. Other analogies may re-
late situations at the same locations, and so forth. There are many possible 
combinations that can arise in a similarity event-type Es' For instance, two 
situation conjuncts might share one individual out of two in a binary rela-
tion -- they would not have individual equivalence. Two conjuncts with dif-
ferent predicates or polarities also cannot have individual or locational 
equivalence because they do not share an event-type conjunct with an 
anchored relation and polarity. 
One might ask, -For what is all this useful?- I doubt that knowing 
whether two situations have total locational equivalence, for example, can 
assist in doing infere'llCe or in telling how similar two situations are relative 
to two others. But knowing the many forms that the similarity event-type 
can take does seem, nonetheless, to be helpful in creating the general case al-
gorithms for reasoning by analogy. It also reminds us that analogy can 
mean any type of similarity in the theory as constructed. A space probe on 
Mars and a candy bar are analogous in their not being Bob Hope. This may 
seem a ludicrous case to allow, but we want to take advantage of any ex-
plicit knowledge one way or the other, so if a data base of constraints 
specifically implies that the probe and the candy bar are both not Bob Hope, 
then thi~ should be honored as a similarity. The probe and candy bar have 
a proper ty equivalence, however weak. Analogy extends also to situations 
like my playing the eighteenth hole at Fort Collins today with the same golf 
ball and clubs that I used yesterday. Descriptions of these two situations 
might have total individual equivalence, although the time difference be-
tween yesterday and today means that they have no locational equivalence. 
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The similarity between two situations may also be classified according 
to the levels of involvement at which they have some abstracted type of 
equivalence. This refers to how many implication constraints need to be in-
voked on the descriptions of two situations before the shared relation in 
question is found. It may be known, for instance, that individual a in situa-
tion ec is a firetruck and that individual b in e A is also a firetruck. And fur-
ther, it may be that there is no event-type which is part of either ec or e A 
(and which does not include a conjunct with the predicate 'firetruck') such 
that the event-type implies that a or b is a firetruck. If there is in fact no 
such event-type then the property of being a firetruck is information as 
specific as any we know about the individuals a and b. This is a case of 0-
level equivalence. Suppose instead that a and b are equivalent only in that 
they are both vehicles, and that while a is a firetruck as before, b is a family 
car. In this case, firing constraints on the two situations, 
in eO: at I: firetruck,a;1 
and 
in eA: at I': car,b;l, 
reveals that a and b are both vehicles, and that the resulting event-type con-
junct in E,,: 
in Es: at I: vehicle,a;l, 
represents n-Ievel equivalence, where n=the maxi-min number of constraints 
required to be invoked to tell that a and b are both vehicles. If (a) Firetruck 
'"'* Truck '"'* Vehicle, and (b) Car '"'* Vehicle, then the maximum of the two 
minimum constraint firings is two (invoked in the case of a), so the situa-
tions have 2-level equivalence. If there were, in the description of ec' no 
more specific information about a than that it is a vehicle, then if b is a car 
and Car '"'* Vehicle, the event-type conjunct in Es would have I-level equiv-
alence because one constraint is fired in e A' zero are fired in ec' and one is 
greater than zero. 
Given a data base of constraints which have several levels of entail-
ment possible in them, this might be useful as a way of describing why, say, 
two Mars bars are equivalent at a more basic level than are a candy-bar and 
a space probe. In the latter pair, constraint firings might eventually tell us 
that the bar and the probe are both • things·, but this level of similarity is 
clearly less impressive than a O-level equivalence. Otherwise, I really have 
worked out no theories about levels of equivalence and I doubt that they can 
be useful in formulating rules about inference. 
If two objects are similar, we might ask whether this implies that they 
are n-Ievel equivalent for some finite n. The assumption in my theory is that 
the answer is yes, but we might imagine cases in which oo-level equivalence 
would destroy this assumption. That is, it may be that two things can seem 
to be similar even though they share no explicable properties which account 
-for our intuitive grasp of their similarity. This possibility has been called 
• dyadic similariiy·117 and its importance for analogy will be discussed later 
in this essay. 
117 Myers,. Inexplicable Analogies· ,Philosophy and Phenomenological Reaearch,22,p. 327 
42 
ClassifYing the Forms of Analogical Justification 
In part n of this essay, the form of analogy was given as follows: 
P(A)AQ(A) 
PCB) 
Q(B) 
where P(A), Q(A), and P(B) are the premises and Q(B) is the conclusion. It 
was shown that this reduces to an induction followed by a deduction: 
peA) 
~ 
P (x) =*Q(x) 
PCB) 
Q(B) . 
This two-step formulation was discovered by Aristotle, as I mentioned in 
part n of this essay, but there is another way of arriving at Q(B). Specifi-
cally, analogy may also consist of an induction followed by an abduction, as 
follows: 
peA) 
9..~1 
Q(x) =*P (x) 
P (B) 
Q(B) . 
The problem of analogy is traditionally that of justifying the first step 
-- what Aristotle called the -incomplete induction -. Theorem 16 established 
that a sufficient condition for concluding P(x)=*Q(x) from P(A)AQ(A) is that 
P(x) decides whether Q?(x), which I write -P(x}>-Q?(x)-. H the second step 
is a syllogism, then the inference from analogy is logically necessary given 
the premises and that P(x)>-Q?(x). But this is not the only type of analogi-
cal reasoning that is possible. It may be, for instance, that the conclusion of 
the first step is merely plausible instead of being valid, and it may be that 
the second step is abductive instead of deductive. 
I contend that there are four types of analogical inference that have 
any kind of logical justification. The four kinds are presented initially in the 
table below, in which -the generalization- refers to the conclusion of the 
first step in the analogy and the - rule application - refers to the mode of in-
ference whereby the second step's conclusion is reached: 
Form of 
Justification 
Pure Deductive 
Pure Abductive 
Strong 
Inductive 
Weak Inductive 
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Status of the 
Generalization 
Valid 
Valid 
Plausible 
Plausible 
Rule 
Application 
Deduction 
Abduction 
Deduction 
Abduction 
In the table above, a valid generalization means that the rule (e.g. 
P(x)~Q(x» is inferred from both P(A)I\Q(A) and a determinative test con-
dition (e.g. P(x)>-Q?(x)). This is the Cirst inference step in the analogy. The 
second st.ep is the application of a rule of inference. If the generalization is 
P(x)~Q(x), and P(B) is observed, then Q(B) is concluded by application of 
t.he syllogism, a. deductive rule of inference. If the generalization is 
Q(x)~P(x), then Q(B) is concluded by abduction. The question that 
remains, then, is what it means for the generalization to be merely plausible. 
When the generalization from P(A)I\Q(A) is valid, it follows soundly, 
but we may sometimes wish to conclude the generalization even when it is 
not strictly valid, in which case the first step in the analogy is inductive in-
stead of deductive. We can get into trouble, as was demonstrated in part fl, 
if we allow the generalization to be concluded automatically from just one 
instance (A). For one thing, merely knowing P(A)I\Q(A) does not indicate 
that we should prefer P(x)~Q(x) over Q(x)~P(x). In addition, Q may not 
be a projectible property in Goodman's terms, or there may be abundant 
counter-examples to either generalization. Finally, there may simply be no 
reason to think that the occurrence of P has anything to say about whether 
Q occurs with it, as in the example of the car with a wadded up piece of 
paper in the back seat. We would not want to conclude that all the other 
cars in Ford's lot have wadded up pieces of paper in their back seats. 
A test condition which is less demanding than determination but which 
should make the induction step have some plausibility is the condition that 
P(x) be relevant to whether Q7(x), which I write as ·P(x)tQ?(x)·. In the ex-
ample above, then, the generalization that all the Ford cars in the lot have 
wadded up pieces of paper in them would not be concluded because the fact 
that a car is a Ford in a given lot is irrelevant to whether or ilOt it has a 
wadded up piece of paper in it. In order to test for releva.nce, one might 
just include facts like ·P(x) is relevant to Q?(x)· in the data. base of con-
.straints, but I think that relevance can be defined in terms of determination. 
The type of relevance I have been discussing so far is relevance in deciding 
the truth value of Q?(x), so let's deCine that Cirst. 
Definition 24: P?(x) is relevant to deciding Q?(x) iff there is 
a minimally sufficient1l8 conjunction 1\::1 D?i(x) such that (i) the 
USBy minimally sufficient, I mean that it should not be possible to remove any conjunct 
or conjuncts and have the remaining conjunction still be a determinant 
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conjunction decides Q?(x), (ii) there is no i in {I, ... m} for which 
Q=Dj> and (iii) P=D i for some i. 
This definition says that P?(x)tQ?(x) if and only if P?(x) is part of a 
determinant oC Q?(x). It can be generalized in situation theory to cover 
Cunctional as well as truth value relevance as follows: 
Definition 25: An event-type E is relevant to the deter-
mination of a conclusion event-type E' iff there is an event-type 
E* such that (i) E* determines E' and is minimal (viz, there is no 
event-type E: such that la] E: determines E', Ib] E:""'E*, and Ic] 
E* is of type E:), (ii) E' is not part of E"119, and (iii) E is part of 
E*.120 
The four varieties of analogical justification may now be expounded 
more completely: 
Pure Deductive Analogy 
This is the only type of sound inference by analogy. Given an analogy 
{eO,eA,Es,ED }, an unknown ElJ' and a conclusion E' of which Eu is type, 
the conclusion follows by pure deduction if there is an E (with Es of type E) 
such that E determines E' (the test condition). The test condition is fulfilled 
if E involves E', in which case the analogous case is redundant, although it 
might be useful in identifying the determinant and/or the conclusion. If, on 
the other hand, the anchoring of unshared indeterminates in E' by the con-
sequent event-type E'" cannot be completely discovered without examining 
e A' then the analogous case is informative. It may also be true that a con-
clusion about e A can be reached by examining eO as an analogous case, so 
that the situations are analogically interactive. And finally, the mere fact 
that an analogy exists between eO and e A may give us some more infor-
mation about the central case, so that the two situations are actually syner-
gistic. For instance, I dropped my backpack on an OxCord don's feet while 
leaving the Old Library one day. He reacted kindly, but if I had done it 
again the next day his reaction might have been different just because I had 
inflicted this unpleasantness on him a second time. Inertia effects may also 
be examples of synergy, e.g. Congress will pass more readily what it has 
passed before. 
Pure Abductive Analogy 
If the conclusion E' determines E (with Es of type E), then the in-
ference that the conclusion event-type is anchored in eo by analogy with e A 
is not sound but is instead hypothetical. Such analogies a.re a.bductive be-
cause they provide us with an explanation, though not necessarily the only 
119This requirement was pointed out to me by Stuart Russell 
12°It may be challenged that being part of a determinant is not a necessary, while it 
may be a sufficient, condition for relevance in determining. Such a challenge might run as 
follows: A person's sex is relevant to determining his or her name, yet it is dirficult to think 
of a minimally sufficient determinant for name which would include sex. My present 
answer to this is that the relevance which I have deCined may not match exactly with an 
ordinary language definition of 'relevance' but may be closer to the condition for plausible 
generalization. I cannot see how knowing that a person is male helps one to decide 
plau8ibly whether or not his name is 'Ray'. It only tells us that it is possible. 
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possible one, (or at least part o( the central case. It is ditricult to say what 
constitutes a cogent abductive conclusion by analogy. One might regard the 
conclusion as a hypothesis to be tested. If one provisionally concludes E''', 
then other constraints may allow one to conclude additional facts about ec' 
These may be tested against conclusions about ec which are drawn soundly 
without assuming E', such as conclusions implied by the data base and 
sound conclusions by analogy with other situations. 
Strong Inductive Analogy 
If E is relevant to E' but is not sufficient to determine E' then the 
conclusion by analogy is merely plausible, or inductive. For instance, in an 
earlier example, the make and design of a car were said to determine the 
car's engine-type. If two cars are only known to have the same de8ign, then 
it is not certain that they have the same type of engine, but there is at least 
some grounding for this conclusion. By an induction it is assumed that all 
cars with the design of the car in e A have its type of engine, and then the 
rule is applied to the car in ec' As one would expect, this is a very unstable 
form of inference. Its cogency clearly depends on how close E is to being a 
determinant of E', Le. how relevant E is. I have not come up with a good 
way to mea·S1)r~ t.his . The conclusion may also be tested using certain ad-
junct condition8 (such as whether the generalization has any known 
counter-examples) which are discussed in the next section. 
Weak Inductive Analogy 
The final form of analogical justification occurs when the conclusion E' 
is relevant to E. In this case, the inductive generalization that the E'" 
anchoring of E' involves the abstracted similarity portion E" is not a sound 
inference but has some grounding, and the projection of E' onto ec is an ab-
duction. The net result is a conclusion that is p088ibly an explanation for 
the abstracted portion E of Es' This form of inference is weaker than 
strong inductive analogy because it not only involves an unstable generaliza-
tion but also generates a mere hypothesis even given that the generalization 
holds. Thus, it must pass all the adjunct tests for both inductive and abduc-
tive analogy, to be discussed shortly. Obviously, a particular weak inductive 
analogy may be more cogent than a particular strong inductive analogy, the 
difference in terminology just reflects differences in the number of steps 
which are not sound, which is one in the strong case and is two in the weak 
case. 
The four forms of legitimate analogy may be summarized using simple 
predicate symbols as follows: 
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Pure Deductive Analogy Pure Abductive Analogy 
P (x) ;>Q? (x) P? (x) ~Q(x) 
P (A) I:Q(A) P (A)I:Q(A) 
PCB) P (B) 
Q(B) Q(B) 
Strong Inductive Analogy Weak Inductive Analogy 
P (x) rQ? (x) P?(x)~Q(x) 
P (A) I:Q(A) P (A) I:Q (A) 
PCB) PCB) 
Q(B) Q(B) 
Inference Using Situations and Adjunct Conditions 
The theory of analogy as I have outlined it suggests a means by which 
a comput.er could infer constraints based on examination of one or more 
situation descript.ions. For purely deductive analogies, the new rule is in-
ferred with certainty, but if the form of justification is one of the other three 
varieties, then there is a lot of ways in which the conclusion might be con-
tradicted by other knowledge and beliefs. I wish to discuss some computa-
tional methods for both sound and non-sound reasoning by analogy. 
Consider first t.he case of pure deductive analogy. I imagine that the 
knowledge base of a situation-based system might contain a large set of 
separate situa.tion descript.ions (coes), aU entirely anchored. I further sup-
pose that the knowledge base would contain a set of constraints relating 
event-types in varying degrees of abstraction, and that some constraints 
would be • involves· constraints and some would be ·determines· con-
straints, with perhaps some ·is relevant to· constraints and any other 
desired kind thrown in. Let us say that the system is working on a situation 
in which a 22-year-old American student is entering East Berlin at Check-
point Charlie. A similar situation at a different time (yesterday) is retrieved 
from the knowledge base, and in that situation, the student had his passport 
stamped. Should the computer conclude that the student will have his 
passport stamped in the present situation? The test condition to be applied 
is whether or not there is a subset of the similarities between the two situa-
tions which determines whether or not the passport will be stamped. By 
firing constraints on the similarity , it may be learned that. Checkpoint Char-
lie is a border entrance for East Germany, that East Germany is a country, 
and that passport stamping is a border control procedure. Another con-
straint may tell the computer that which country a border entrance is in 
determines its control procedures, and hence the conclusion that the 
. passport will be stamped again is valid by application of a new • involves· 
constraint formed from the determinative one. The key maneuver in finding 
out whether the similarity contains a determinant Cor the conclusion is to 
fire constraints on the event-types in the proposed test condition. 
In this example, the similarity contains much extraneous information 
-- that the person is a student, American, 22, etc. This information is a 
hindrance to deciding which test condition should be tried because there are 
so many possible ones. In this observation I think we have a clue to what 
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makes a good analogous case, namely, that its similarity with the central 
case should be close to the determinant in the test condition. A second 
thing to notice about this example is that the determination constraint is a 
default rule. Clearly, it would be violated if the student forgot his passport. 
The rule is probably useful nonetheless because it applies most of the time. 
An extension of this theory would be to allow -multi-valued-truth assign-
ments (or probabilities) for constraints, instead of just 0 or 1. Finally, it 
should be pointed out that a by-product of the inference by analogy is the 
addition of a new -involves- constraint to the knowledge base, namely that 
East German border guards always stamp passports. 
If the form of the justification is purely abductive then the same con-
siderations as above apply but for discovering that the conclusion implies 
some portion of the observed similarity instead of the other way around. 
However, since the conclusion is no longer guaranteed to hold even by 
default, the system will need to do some checking of adjunct conditions, or 
tests for the consistency and reasonableness of the conclusion. For abductive 
analogy, these criteria include the following: 
1. The conclusion should predict no results which are contradicted 
by those facts about the central case which are not part of the 
explained event-type. 
2. Thtlre should either be no contradicting alternative conclusion 
which implies the same subset of the facts about ee' or else any 
such alternatives should be able to be judged less likely than the 
conclusion, by some means. 
3. There should be no counter-analogy with some other situation 
which predicts a conclusion at odds with the present conclusion. 
4. There should either be no counter-example situations in which 
E" occurs without E"', or else any such examples should be 
judged dis analogous in some significant way. 
5. If heuristic risk values can be assigned to rejecting and accepting 
the conclusion, then the risk involved in accepting should be less 
than the risk involved in rejecting. And, 
6. In general, the a priori probability of the conclusion should com-
pare favorably with those of other hypotheses which are not in-
consistent with the known situation and are therefore competing 
hypotheses. 
This is not a complete, rigorous list, but merely an indication of the 
types of tests one should do. The second disjuncts in criteria 2 and 4 are ob-
viously very fuzzy. 
For inductive analogy, the adjunct conditions are safeguards against 
concluding an -involves- constraint which is contradicted in the knowledge 
base or which would otherwise be ill-founded: 
1. The conclusion E' should be projectible, unlike -grue-. 
2. The inferred constraint that E" involves E'" (or that E'" in-
volves E", in the case of weak inductive analogy) should have no 
counter-examples in the knowledge base of situations. 
3. There should be no counter-analogy which would result in a 
sound or very plausible conclusion contradicting the original con-
clusion E'. This would be any situation sharing some set of con-
juncts other than E (though possibly with overlap) which would 
determine or be relevant to part of E' and result in a different 
polarity for at least one conjunct in E'. And, 
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4. There should be no part of the determinant E* of type E (or E', 
in the case of weak inductive analogy) which is unknown or con-
tained in the dis analogy and is ·crucial· (whatever that means) 
to determining E' (or E). (Of course even a fully determinative 
disanalogy does not disprove the conclusion since both an antece-
dent and its complement can imply a consequent, but finding 
such a disanalogy mandates some counter-checking to see if a 
disproof of the conclusion is possible.) 
This is probably not a complete list either, although I think it captures 
most of what can go wrong. The adjunct conditions must be fulfilled in in-
ductive analogies in addition to the test condition, which is either that E be 
relevant to E' (strong) or that E' be relevant to E (weak). Strong inductive 
analogies need to satisfy the inductive adjunct criteria (for plausible 
generalization), while weak inductive analogies must fulfill both the induc-
tive and the abductive adjunct conditions. 
IV. Tests of the Theory and the Analysis of Analogies 
Theories are usually evaluated according to their explanatory power, 
so it seems proper to try applying this theory oC analogy to a mix of 
problems. In particular, the theory should be able to answer some, iC not all, 
oC the questions about analogy which motivated its study. I think, as it hap-
pens, that the theory can also explain some of what we already knew about 
analogy, but in a more precise way, and it may now be clearer just where 
other accounts of analogy either work or fall short in this regard. Finally, I 
will try to put the theory and my perspective on analogy to work in analyz-
ing some example analogies. 
Answering the Requirements for an Analogy Theory 
I would like firstly to consider the eight categories of questions for 
theories oC analogy which were proposed in part II oC this essay. I do not 
wish to go through the questions one by one, since some of them have ob-
vious answers already set forth in the theory and others are presently un-
answerable from it. Rather, I would like to point out implications oC the 
situational theory of analogy which might not be obvious and which appear 
to answer some of the questions. 
One question about the form of analogy concerned how and whether 
one should distinguish between figurative and literal analogies. An example 
oC a figurative analogy is one of the Reagan/Bush Committee's political 
commercials Crom Ronald Reagan's lQ84 re-election campaign. The com-
mercial depicted a situation in which a human is trapped in a woods with a 
hungry bear on the prowl. By analogy, the argument appears to be that, 
just as the woods dweller should be armed with a gun to defend against the 
bear, the United States should have a strong defense against the Soviet 
. Union. In a figurative analogy, property equivalences between analogues do 
not seem to form the determinant; thus it is not that a woods dweller is 
much like the U.S. or that the bear is much like the U.S.S.R., or even that 
the woods a,re like the world. Instead, the relations between these in-
dividuals seem to be the salient similarity, namely the relation of one in-
dividual posing a threat to another. Literal analogies, in general, seem to be 
those in which there is a great deal of O-level property equivalence in the 
determinant event-type. As properties get less specifically similar and as n-
level relational equivalences predominate in the determinant, the analogy 
gets more figurative, but the theory seems to indicate that there is no way 
to draw a line between the two since any combination of types of similarity 
is possible. 
I think the theory can also shed some light on questions about 
analogy's place among modes of inference. The second step in analogy as I 
construe it is a straightforward application of either deduction or abduction. 
The first step -- concluding the rule -- is either deductive or what I have 
termed, by default, inductive. This latter covers cases in which the 
generalization is merely plausible, not valid, but the requirement for 
plausibility (namely, relevance) is more stringent than inductive criteria 
which guard against contradictions in the knowledge base and against non-
projectibility. The problem of justifying induction as the number n of in-
stances approaches infinity is different from the problem of justifying 
analogies. The difference is that questions about relevance and deter-
minability go away as n gets very large, whereas whether or not the conclu-
sion is projectible continues to be a problem even when, say, a thousand 
green emeralds have been observed before midnight and thus been called 
• grue-, for one would not want to say that emeralds observed tomorrow will 
be blue. In the case of the wadded up piece of paper in the back seat of a 
car in Ford's lot, the conclusion that all these cars have this property is a 
projectible conclusion because as one observes more and more cars with 
pieces of paper in them one eventually believes that all cars in the lot have 
the property. One would expect that for inferences based on some number 
of instances neither large nor small, a mix of principles of good analogy 
(determinability or relevance) and for believable induction (number of con-
firming instances, projectibility, consistency) would be applied. 
The theory demonstrates, in response to questions about the justifica-
tion and soundness of reasoning by analogy, that inferences from parallel 
cases can, under certain circumstances, be both valid and necessary for con-
cluding new constraints. Whether a substantial number of explicit analogies 
in real life are of this type is unclear, but it does seem to be a mechanism for 
everyday conclusions by analogy which we make without labelling them as 
such. What is really lacking in the theory is a way to evaluate the cogency 
of non-sound arguments by analogy. It does, however, indicate how an anal-
ogy might go wrong. If no part of the similarity is relevant to determining 
the conclusion and vice versa, then the argument has no legitimacy, as I see 
it. Furthermore, inferences by analogy that are not sound need to pass the 
adjunct conditions, precluding conclusions which are inconsistent with sound 
predictions or other examples, or which are of ludicrous probability versus 
the alternatives, are non-projectible, or are realistically undecidable given 
the unknown or disanalogous status of crucially relevant factors. 
Some hints are given in the theory regarding the purposes and 
methods of analogy. Even redundant analogues can be useful in identifying 
possible conclusions which can then be verified or in pruning the set of facts 
from which one attempts to prove the conclusion, and when a relevant or 
determining similarity can be demonstrated to exist between two cases, a 
·conclusion may be reached which would not otherwise be possible to infer. I 
think the theory also argues strongly that similarity should not be the 
criterion which is optimized in seeking good analogues. Salient similarities 
seem to be just those which either determine or are determined by a conclu-
sion from the unknown. 
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Explaining Some Introspective Data 
Questions about the cognitive nature of analogical inference, which 
formed the last category of requirements set forth in part IT, are very dif-
ficult to answer. I am not sure to what extent human analogizing can be 
mapped onto the logical structure which I have proposed, but I would like to 
cite three applications of parts of the theory which have occurred to me 
since I began working on this subject. The three ·case studies· involve ob-
servations about how analogy functions in arguments, in thinking, and in 
learning. 
Counter-examples and Counter-analogies 
It struck me, as I thought about analogies I had collected from ar-
guments and debates, that the function of analogy in arguments is often 
two-tiered. In arguing about what is the right conclusion for the central 
case at issue, a. wa.y of opposing someone else's conclusion is to argue that 
the central case has an analogous case, and that the analogous case (a) dis-
proves the opponent's conclusion and (b) establishes either a hypothetical or 
a plausib le or even a valid counter-conclusion. It accomplishes (a) in one of 
two ways: either by counter-example or by counter-analogy. In the former 
method the analogous case is an attempt to capture the antecedent con-
ditions in the generalization which one's opponent is assumed to be making, 
either because the opponent has explicitly stated the generalization or be-
cause it is marginally inferable from his or her position on the central issue. 
If the antecedent (or determinant or relevant event-type) describes the 
analogous case and this case contradicts what the other is concluding, then 
the effect of the analogy is to disprove the generalization by counter-
example. A counter-analogy disproves the generalization in a slightly dif-
ferent way, by finding a determinant or relevant similarity (for the 
conclusion) which is not the antecedent of the generalization but which is 
nonetheless shared by the central and analogous cases such that the 
analogous case contradicts the conclusion. 
Clearly, if two determinants lead to different conclusions or if the same 
determinant has different consequences in two analogies then one's data base 
is inconsistent, but if the generalizations being made are merely plausible 
then it is easy to see how counter-examples and counter-analogies could be 
found in a consistent system of beliefs. This, I propose, is a lot of what is 
going on in arguments. Thomson's violinist analogy, for instance, is a 
counter-example to the generalization that any person with a right to life 
cannot be disconnected from a solely-capable life-sustainer at the sustainer's 
request. I am now satisfied that I had just been taking the generalization for 
granted before I read Thomson's article and that she provides good reason 
to reject it. Usually, one's opponent does not state a precise generalization, 
so one picks a generalization whose scope appears to be wide enough to be 
covered by the analogy and hopes that this will force a retreat. The situa-
'tional theory seems to be a help in analyzing these arguments, about which I 
will have more to say in the example analyses. 
Analogy and Memory in Thinking 
Because the topic of analogy has pre-occupied me for the past seven or 
eight months, I have often stopped myself in mid-thought realizing that I am 
thinking analogically . What my theory is not equipped to explain is the 
rapidity with which the human mind is able to call up an appropriate 
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analogous case given a new situation. A student thinks about which of his 
week's worth o( ideas he might tell to his advisor. Immedia.tely the student 
is reminded of an old saying he heard back in his photography days: • A 
good pbotographer is one who never shows his ba.d pictures.· A good stu-
dent, then, should never reveal his bad ideas. The thought is momentary; 
the analogy clicks, or it does not. 
How the saying a.bout photographers just popped into my head, I do 
not know. This is the problem of searching for and matching an analogue, 
and it may well be that. Hume was right in holding that tbe recognition of 
resembling ideas is just a. case of association. My theory is aimed at explain-
ing one's eva.luation of the analogue after it is retrieved from memory, which 
seems to be a separate process, taking place after matching. H, say, I have 
a.n overdue book at the mathematical sciences libra.ry, I tend automatically 
to think that I can avoid a fine up to a. week after it is due because, al-
though I have not tested this at that parti.cular Ijbrary, I know that at Green 
and Meyer Libraries the overdue notices do 1l0t come out right away. Once 
this thought occurs to mc, I eva·luate the analogy and its conclusion. Is it 
reasonable to assume in this case that what holds for Meyer and Green will 
hold for the math library? I ponder the likelihood that the math folks send 
out notices by tbe same procedure as th.e other libra.ries do. My inquiry has 
turned to the test condition: Does the library's being a Stanford University 
Library determine its billing procedures? Cautiously, plausibly, I think yes. I 
returned the book and was not fined. 
Dreyfus' Theory of Skill Acquisition 
In a well attended lecture at the Stanford Center for the Study of Lan-
guage and Information this year, Hubert Dreyfus argued that lists of if-then 
rules are not sufficient (or constructing systems that are truly "expert·. 121 
Instead, Dreyfus says, experts are experts in virtue of their vast accumulated 
experience with speci(ic examples, a.nd skill acquisition moves away from ap-
plying a.bstract rules and toward recalling particular cases. 
Dreyfus' example domain is chess-playing. A novice chess player, he 
says, knows a Cew general rules like the rules or the g9.ITle and heuristics like 
"Get control of the center.· At this stage, the pla.yer has to think about 
what moves are possible under the rules and calculates which move to make. 
At the advanced beginner and intermediate levels, a.ccording to Dreyfus j the 
player can draw on his own rules which have been formed from experience 
and, more importantly, recognize playing positions similar to those that have 
been encountered in the past and try to apply them. By the time a player is 
an expert, D.reyfus says that he or she just "sees· the right move or a very 
goo.d one almost ins tan tJy, based on his or her • holistic memory" of common 
configurations and on some intuitive mechanism for grasping the relevant 
position and applying it. This theory , based partly on empirical studies of 
chess experts, is Dreyfus' alternative to the old idea that a true expert has 
evolved a set of rules wbich only need to be articulat.ed and programmed by 
computer scientists in order for the expertise to be duplicated. 
1 suggest that one does not .have to throwaway the concept of rules in 
order to represent such an expert's knowledge, for the rules appear just to 
be getf',ing more situation-specific. Whether the specific rules are actually 
represented and calculaLed upon as such or just acted in accordance with in 
121Dreyrus, "From Socrates to Expert Systems: The Limits or Calculative Rationality" 
(CSLI Colloquium), March 14, 1985 
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some more basic mental process is a question I cannot answer. What seems 
to me interesting is how the situational theory can explain the process of 
forming this large and specific set of rules. Perhaps a novice knows or 
believes a set of constraints, some determinative and some implicative. To 
one who is inexperienced in chess, each new situation will probably have to 
be calculated upon by applying constraints. But as she or he gains a wider 
memory of chess situations, the advanced beginner and intermediate player 
can make moves by analogy with past positions, using determination and 
relevance rules as justification. Finally, at an expert level, the player can 
apply a constraint to an impending move immediately because so many have 
been formed from earlier analogies. Determination considerations are no 
longer needed at this point; the player zooms in parallel on the ·involves· 
constraint with the appropriate antecedent event-type and applies the con-
sequent to the situation at hand. 
This might work for a chess program, but Dreyfus would probably 
argue that it is hopeless as a model of how human chess players become ex-
perts. People usually cannot recall very many specific positions from past 
games or articulate the antecedent conditions in the highly specific con-
straints I am construing. Still, I think this exercise at least demonstrates 
that one needn't posit some holistic mechanism to model expertise -- it may 
just be a matter of explaining how the mind could form new, more specific 
rules, and the fact that past situations or rules often cannot be articulated 
may just be because they are known at some subconscious level. Dreyfus 
cites as support for his theory the fact that chess grandmasters who can 
usually make a good move instantly in real games must nonetheless calculate 
like everyone else when solving chess ·puzzles", presumably because these 
are problems which would rarely have occurred in the expert's past ex-
perience. This phenomenon would be expected under the situational theory 
because there would presumably be no constraints in one's knowledge base 
to cover such "puzzle· situations as there would be for more common posi-
tions. 
Comparisons and Contrasts with Other Theories 
In part n of this essay I reviewed the types of account of ana.logy that 
I ha;ve identified in the literature. These included deductive, inductive, ab-
ductive, similarit.y-based, and associationist theories plus some hybrids. I see 
my t heory as incorporating the first three, for the most part rejecting the 
four th and leaving the psychological association theories as possible explana-
tions for how an alogies are found. 
Since my theory allows for analogies which are either valid , hypotheti-
cal, plausible, or plausibly hypothetical, this helps to explain why cogent 
analogy has been looked upon variously as logically necessary, inductively 
plausible, or just abductively suggestive. W eitzenfeld 122 demonstrated 
validity for cases in which the conclusion is what I call ·functionally 
determined" (solved) by the similarity, but I think that this does not ac-
. count for an analogies. Firstly, truth value determination (decision) also 
seems to be necessary, especially for test conditions. Secondly, sometimes we 
know that the conclusion is not fully determined by the similarity rat her 
than just being uIl certain about it and yet we still believe the conclusion. 
And thirdly, sometimes the conclusion is merely hypothetical and determines 
or is relevant to the similarity as opposed to the reverse. My strongest dis-
1220p. Cit.,Weitzenfeld,pp. 137-149 
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agreement with Weitzenfeld is that I think there is no reason to assume, as 
he appears to, that the determining structure for any given function is 
unique. 123 A Cootball player's uniform or the coach he or she plays for can 
either of them determine the player's team membership; neither is unique in 
this respect. 
Although my theory allows for analogies whose generalizations are 
merely plausible, there are some differences between my inductive Corms of 
analogy and inductive forms proposed by others. I hold that the relevance 
test condition exists in addition to projectibility in cogent analogies, so they 
are somewhat more justified than arbitrary single-instance inductions. Also, 
other theories do not admit an abductive application, as an alternative to 
syllogism, of the plausible generalization. Perhaps the most important thing 
to notice about the condition for plausible rule formation in my theory is 
that it merely stipulates that Borne relevant event-type must exist in the 
similarity or conclusion. For inductive analogy, one has the option not to 
infer a specific constraint but to allow the anchored conclusion to be 
projected to the central case based on the belief that there is a relevant 
event-type Bomewhere in the similarity (or conclusion, in the weak case). I 
therefore do not feel that the generalization step needs to be explicit, only 
that it be known that one is possible. 
I disagree with Hesse and Russell that explanatory hypotheses Crom 
analogies are intrinsically more believable than other hypotheses.124 For it 
seems to me that there is no logical reason to prefer a conclusion based on 
analogy to another hypothesis which is equally explanatory if the analogized 
conclusion is not determined either totally or plausibly by the similarity. In 
making it clear how such analogies entail abduction, I think my theory can 
explain why the analogical argument for other minds, for instance, is so logi-
cally problematic however intuitively appealing it may be. 
My theory does not use any similarity measure as a condition for 
analogical inference. A determinant or relevant similarity event-type may 
be very weak in the degree of similarity it represents, which is consistent 
with my position that strength of similarity has no direct bearing on the 
legitimate cogency of an analogy. Heuristically, the amount of similarity 
may be a good way to match initial analogues, but it does not work as a jus-
tification for conclusions. Theories based on psychological explanation may 
yet be necessary to account for how analogies occur to us and for the 
cogency of some analogies like the other minds argument, but I think the 
situational theory at least shows that there is a broad range of analogies 
whose logical justifications can be identified. 
The relevance-based theory of Shaw and Ashleyl2& is a relatively new 
type of theory, odd as that fact seems, in the game of justifying analogy. 
Shaw and Ashley do not give a definition of relevance in their paper or 
make it clear that relevance is not enough if the disanalogy is relevant also 
and can lead to a different conclusion by counter-analogy. But I think they 
had the right idea in emphasizing relevance, and now it seems that the ques-
. tion is, -How much relevance is enough?-
123Ibid .,pp. 139-141 
124See discussion under "Theories Based on Abductive Hypothesis" in part II or this es-
say 
1250p. Cit.,Shaw and Ashley,pp. 415-432 
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Analyzing Analogies 
Philosophers of argument have often condemned the use of analogies. 
William Sacksteder, who does not condemn analogy, asserts that many 
philosophers and rhetoricians • suppose analogies to be notoriously 
'illogical',· belonging • to realms in which validity is not in question: to in-
ventive inquiry, to rerinement of exposition and teaching, or to literary 
grace .• 126 Irving Copi says that • no argument by analogy is ever valid· 
though some are very cogent,127 and M. C. Beardsley, as I noted earlier, 
maintains that analogy is not cogent at all. 128 I have proven that Copi was 
mistaken -- analogies can be valid, but there is also this feeling in many, in-
cluding me, that analogies can be extremely misleading despite their power 
to convince people. I can explain the existence oC analogies that are il-
legitimate; namely, they are ones in which the similarity event-type neither 
determines nor is relevant to the conclusion and vice versa. The question is, 
why would people be convinced by illegitimate analogical arguments or at-
tach greater cogency to them than is theoretically justified? Put another 
way, under what circumstances can an argument by analogy be misleading! 
Here I believe that strength of similarity and psychological explanation 
can rind their rightful places in my theory. My experience indicates that, 
however fallacious I think it is, human beings are in fact inclined to act in 
accordance with the Similarity Principle, expecting further likeness when 
some likeness is observed. It is this tendency in human behavior which, if I 
would stop short of calling it the source oC all evil in the world, nonetheless 
seems to be responsible Cor the bad analogizing that goes on. An analogy is 
misleading, in short, iC the Similarity Principle predicts a conclusion which 
would fail the test condition or adjunct criteria for that type of analogy. 
Humans are endowed with two gifts. One is the ability to perceive 
analogies, which is intuitive, psychological, associative at a deep level and 
hard to explain. The other is the ability to test analogies, which is analyti-
cal, logical, and argumentative and the methods for which I have discussed. 
The problem is that it is too easy, without an opposition debating us, to ex-
ercise our first ability without exercising the second: mental laziness allows 
one to draw analogical conclusions without testing them. The Rt. Hon. 
Lord Wilson of Rievaulx, former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, 
said last year that one of the reasons for his resignation in IQ76 was that he 
was ·afraid of getting stale·. What he meant, he said, was that after you 
have been in charge for a while, 'you see new problems which look like 
something you've encountered before, so you do what you did then, only the 
new situation may be different in some way that calls for a diCferent 
approach.' Furthermore, he said that a fresh prime minister would handle 
such situations with more sensitivity to their nuances.129 However important 
it was to Wilson's decision, this is an interesting comment because we often 
think that the more experiences one has to draw upon, the better will be the 
decisions that emerge. Maybe the key to avoiding staleness is to remain 
wary of the temptation to project unjustified conclusions by analogy. 
126Sacksteder, "The Logic or Analogy " ,Philo8ophy and Rhetoric,I,p. 234 
1270p. Cit.,Copi,p. 358 
1280p. Cit.,Beardsley,p. 113 
129Wilson,"The Kennedy Memorial Lecture" (Oxford Union Society), November 30, 
1984; The passage in single quotes is paraphrased. 
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Sometimes analogical thinking gives us the right answer even when we 
do not examine the test criteria. The alternative to concluding based on 
something we know may be to conclude nothing at all, that we just DON'T 
KNOW. This non-conclusion seems to be repugnant to humans when we 
have a question; it runs against our grain. So we draw an analogy, assume 
the conclusion it generates is right, and sometimes, perhaps often, we get 
lucky. The habit of leaping to analogized conclusions becomes a bit more 
dangerous, however, when we are judging on matters of great importance 
and thus are prey to arguments contrived by those who are biased. That 
people have the capacity to be misled by analogies, combined with the fact 
that arguments in favor of one or another position may cite seductive but il-
legitimate analogies, implies that philosophy should be of some benefit in 
separating good analogies from bad ones if the logical criteria are well 
defined. A comfortable seat in a debating chamber or in front of one's 
television set makes one vulnerable to arguments based on the Similarity 
Principle. Since I have sought to replace this common sense, but invalid, 
standard for drawing analogica.l inferences, I should try to apply my theory 
as well as the ideas about analogy that come out of it to some specific 
analogical arguments and to say what philosophy can tell us about these ar-
guments. 
In argument, most analogies play a dual role. Prior to their role in 
suggesting new conclusions, they are attempts to refute some other conclu-
sion which the arguer is opposing. Such an analogy was invoked during the 
famous -King and Country· debate at the Oxford Union Society in IQaa by 
Quinton Hogg. Speaking against the motion ·That this House will in no cir-
cumstances fight for its King and Country·, 130 Hogg asked his opponents, 
·What would you do if you saw a man raping your wife? Would you inter-
fere, or would you confine yourself to a polite invitation to desist? .131 Hogg 
had generalized the motion to something like -Pacifism is always the best 
policy - one should never defend with force, - and he had given what he saw 
as the most intuitively clear counter-example possible in attempting to 
refute it. But the analogy really suggested its own conclusion, which was 
that Britain's young men should be willing to fight for Britain when it is 
threatened. Notice that the conclusion about the central case (Britain's 
defense) does not follow even if one agrees that the broader generalization 
chosen by Hogg is refuted by the rape example. For this, Hogg would have 
had to show that there is a national defense situation which shares those 
aspects of having one's wife raped which merit force. One can imagine that 
the bombing of Britain by Nazi Germany would have been such an example, 
though perhaps an invasion of Poland would not have. 
In general, I think it is very important to distinguish (a) whether the 
generalization refuted by a given analogy is crucial to the scope of one's op-
position from (b) whether the analogy establishes the conclusion being 
argued for in the central case. An analogy is always a counter-example to 
some generalization. For instance, Stephen Hellma.n of Hertford argued in a 
IQ84 Oxford Union debate against having nuclear weapons in Britain by as-
. serting that the empirical argument that nuclear weapons have kept the 
peace for forty years and are therefore likely to continue doing so is ·like 
the young man who, having fallen off the edge of the cliff, says halfway 
130The motion passed, 275 to 153, which sent a shock wave throughout Britain in 
February or that year - Hollis,The Oxford Union,pp. 186-193 
131Walter,The Oxford Union: Playground of Power,p. 82 
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down, 'Well, I'm all right so far.' .132 This analogy really only shows that 
positive experience when one initially ha.d assumed danger does not nece&-
sarily prove that the experience will not wind up dangerous after all. That 
is the- counter-example aspect of the argument. A stronger conclusion by 
analogy would be that Britain under the nllclear umbrella. is deceived by its 
apparent success while disaster remains inevitable. As a counter-example, 
the a.rgument serves quite nicely, but as an analogy to nuclear defense it ap-
pears to beg the question, {OJ' the whole problem is that we just don't know 
whether committing to nuclear weapons is like jumping oc! a cliff or not. 
Furthermore, the opposition could argue that the rea.l generalization they 
advocate is not that results thus far are always a good predictor of results to 
come but that prolonged peace under a weapons system is a good indication 
that it prevents war. The- scope thus reduced, a new analogy would be 
needed in order to refute the generalization deemed crucial by the opposi-
tion. 
An example of a counter-analogy was provided by a speaker in the 
fll'st Oxford Union debat.e I attended. Nicholas Prettejohn, arguing against 
-This House believes that sexual freedom leads to ruin·, responded to claims 
that such freedom is responsible for violence and disease by saying that one 
seldom hears, in Britain, arguments that other freedoms, like political 
freedom and the ffa dom of movement, which are also demonstrably linked 
to violence and the spread of disease, but are not themselves the causes of 
these, should therefore be abridged.133 That freedom of movement, say, 
shares with sexual freedom the properties of leading to violence and disease, 
and is not considered abrldgea.ble, provides a case analogous to the central 
case in which the conclusion thal freedom should be held responsible is 
refuted. This is a counter-example to the generalization that freedoms 
which allow violence and disease are therefore responsible (or these, but if 
the generalization is just that sexual freedom which allows violence and dis-
ease is responsible for them then the argument is a counter-analogy -- it as-
sumes that a freedom which does not specifically protect against the spread 
o( violence and disease but also does not cause these is a determinant for 
whether or not the freedom is responsible, and it concludes that the cases of 
freedom of movement and political freedom anchor the polarity of -is 
responsible for- to ·no- for the central case. 
In the above example, the conclusion by analogy and the conclusion it 
attempts to refute are polar opposites. This should be the case whenever 
the issue (or debate is a yes or no question. Thus Thomson's violinist anal-
ogy argues, for instance, not only that disconnecting another person is not 
always impermissible but also that abortion is permissible in the case of 
rape. The stronger conclusion succeeds if the antecedent of the generaliza-
tion being refuted is a determinant - in that case the analogous case is both 
a counter-example (counter-analogy) and a way to establish a definite result, 
that not only does the conclusion not necessarily hold for all such cases but 
that it specifically does not hold in the central case. In other counter-
. examples, the analogous case may establish that a generalization is false 
without establishing the specific conclusion being argued, as in the analogy 
from the King and Country debate cited earlier. 
132Hellman proposing the motion "This house calls for a non-nuclear defence policy for 
Britain" (Oxford Union Society), November 27, 1984 
133prettejohn speaking sixth in opposition to "This House believes that sexual heedom 
leads to ruin" (Oxford Union Society), October 12, 1984 
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Analogies in political and ethical debates tend to have this refutational 
character. But in some types of analogical argument, the generalization 
being argued for is much more difficult to identify. These arguments rely on 
a perceived isomorphism between the analogues which is very complex. For 
instance, if one were to ask what it is about the similarity between rats a.nd 
people that allows substances which cause cancer in rats to be assumed car-
cinogenic for humans, one would probably have a difficult time enumerating 
the determinant. Thomas Reid argued that because of the similarities be-
tween the earth and other planets like Mars and Venus (each gets its light 
from the sun, rotates on its axis, etc.), one might assume that the other 
planets could have -living creatures - like the earth does.134 We know now 
that they probably do not (largely from having visited the moon and having 
probed Mars and Venus) and that the similarity between this world and the 
others does not seem to include a determinant for life as we know it. 
For other analogies, the verdict is not in yet. One of the most inter-
esting posited isomorphisms in recent years is the analogy between com-
puters and brains, which may allow us to conclude that digital silicon 
machines can have intentionality. I do not plan to resolve this debate here, 
but only to formula.te it somewhat within my theory of analogy. Human 
beings can understand discourse at a. very deep level - we know what the 
words mean. I would like to bypass distinctions like that between external 
and internal meaning and to assume that for a computer to have inten-
t ionaljty means that it would have essentially the same understanding 
capabilities that I ha,ve. The test condition for concluding that this is pos-
sible in computers is whether the similarjty between brains and computers 
could ever contain a sufficient condition for human-type understanding. It 
seems to me that there are t hree possibilities for the determinant. At its 
most portable level, the requirement for thought would be a software re-
quirement: a. thing understands iC it demonstrates enough flexibility in 
manipUlating symbols, attaching them to objects, and so Corth. At this level, 
a computer made oC silicon could do human-type thinking if it were 
programmed correctly -- the conditions for thought at this level are medium-
independent. At the opposHe extreme, one might hold tha.t nothing ca.n 
think unless it has a soul; minds are not just brains but are something magi-
cal and perhaps can only be made by God or produced naturally. In between 
these two views is the position or philosophers such as John Searle, who 
argues that mental processes like understanding are fundamentally 
biologica\.13& One of Searle's comments sparks me to draw the following 
a.nalogy. Suppose we wanted to make a machine that could do digestion. 
This process goes on in humans as an elaborate exchange of molecules 
through the membranes of cells and involves chemical breakdown and syn-
thesis. To do digestion in silicon or gallium arsenide, one would have to 
implement an analogous low-level chemical process allowing food material 
like chocolate and lettuce, but not shoe leather or book bindings, to be par-
tially incorpora.ted into the material of the machine and partially excreted. 
This is what digestion is . Maybe mental activity has this low-level character 
. too, so that it would be impossible to implement the necessary conditions for 
thought in silicon. On the other hand, perhaps thinking is exactly coin-
cident with the activity (digital computation) that goes on in present-
134Reid , Tbomas,E88aY8 on the Intellectual Powers 0/ Man (Essay I, Cbapter 4), cited 
in Op. Cit.,Copi,p. 352 
135Searle,Minds, Brains, and Science,pp. 28-41 
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technology computers. Perhaps analog computation is required but beyond 
that there is no physical requirement. 136 Or maybe thinking is beyond 
material specification altogether. These are the main possibilities as I see 
them. What is at issue is the scope of the determinant (material-
independent, material-dependent, or extra-material) which will make the 
conclusion by analogy valid if and only if human-type intentionality does not 
require something lying outside the similarity assumed to exist between com-
puters and brains. I would class those whom Daniel Dennett calls 
I computationalists I as believing in the material-independent determinant, 
• holists· as believers in extra-material requirements, and • connectionists I 
as believing in material dependence. 137 
The most commonly debated analogical arguments in philosophy are 
abductive: the conclusion, if true, would help to explain observed effects and 
is therefore accepted as their most probable cause or explanation. The 
problem arises when more than one hypothesis is consistent with what is ob-
served. In particular, two questions to which arguments by analogy have 
been applied are the problem of other minds and the question of God's exist-
ence. I have discussed the analogical argument for other minds at various 
points already. C. W. K. MundIe has criticized philosophers for not paying 
enough attention to this argument, and he concludes his Critique of Lin-
guistic Philosophy wit.h a formulation of the basic argument: 
"I shall end with the challenge to identify the fallacy, if there is 
one, in arguing as follows: 
In my own case, SI Isome specific kind of stimulus] is always or 
usually followed by Ml Isome specific kind of mental act or 
process], Ml is always or usually followed by Bl Isome specific 
kind of bodily behaviour] and/or Bl is always or usually preceded 
byMl; 
John Doe reacted to SI with behaviour Bl, so in view of the many 
similarities between us, anatomical, cultural, etc., there is some de-
gree of probability that in John Doe SI and Bl were mediated by 
Ml. 1 138 
I take it as given that this argument has abductive legitimacy, which only 
gives it the status of generating a hypothesis. MundIe seems to be going fur-
ther, saying that the similarity between another person and me contains a 
determinant for whether or not Ml follows SI. Actually, he asserts only 
that the existence of the determinant is probable "in some degree I , but I do 
not know what this means so I will just treat the conclusion as definite. The 
problem in trying to make the conclusion by analogy sound is just that the 
known similarity does not include a determinant for mental activity. We 
cannot know what it is like to experience someone else's thoughts without 
privileged access to those thoughts, and so without a determinant in the 
similarity, my answer to MundIe's challenge would be that the fallacy in the 
argument is that it relies on the Similarity Principle. Nothing follows from 
the fact that others are like me in observed respects -- that could all be part 
.of the wicked conspirator's (or my mind's) plan. In fact, we don't even 
136Smith, "Is Computation Formal?" (Stanford Philosophy Department Colloquium), 
May 24, 1985 
137Dennett,"Computer Models and the Mind - a view from the East Pole" ,Timu 
Literary Supplement,Dec. 14, 1984 
138Mundle,A Critique 0/ Linguistic Philosophy,p. 277 
know whether any of these observed anatomical similarities are even 
relevant to mental activity, so I am afraid that the argument by analogy for 
other minds is destined to remain non-sound and implausible. There must 
be some reason why we believe in other minds; I agree with A. M. Turing 
that the idea that everyone thinks is a • polite convention - .1311 The conven-
tion is appealing and convenient, and these appear to be the motivation for 
accepting it. 
Of equal philosophical importance is the argument by analogy for the 
existence of God, expressed as the - argument from design - by Hume in his 
Dialogue8,140 and earlier -in the general scholium to Sir Isaac Newton's 
Principia Mathematica - .141 Hume's theist debator Cleanthes expounded it 
in the Dialogue8: 
-Look round the world : Contemplate the whole and every part 
of it: You will find it to be nothing bu one great machine, sub-
divided into an infinite number or lesser machines, which a.gain ad-
mit of subdivisions to a degree beyond what human senses and 
faculties can trace and explain. All these various machines, and 
even their most minute parts, are adjusted to each other with an 
accuracy which ravishes into admiration all men who ever con-
templated them. The curious adapting of means to ends, the 
productions of human contrivance; of human design, thought, wis-
dom, and intelligence. Since therefore the effects resemble each 
other, we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the 
causes also resemble, and that the Author of Nature is somewhat 
similar to the mind of man, though possessed of much larger 
faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work which he has 
executed. By this argument, a posteriori, and by this argument 
alone, do we prove at once the existence of a Deity and his 
similarity to human mind and intelligence .• 142 
The odd thing about the Dialogues, for many, is that Cleanthes' opponent 
Philo, a skeptic like Hume, in tbe end concedes -That tbe cause or causes of 
order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human 
intelligence. _143 To me, the argument from design differs from the argument 
by analogy for otber minds in that no one has come up witb an alternative 
to Philo's conclusion whicb has its explanatory power. One can say that 
what causes universes just isn't known, but Cleanthes offers a possibility we 
can understand. One can say that tbe universe is more like a tree than a 
machine, but concluding that no one designed the machine by analogy with 
the tree is still begging the question because we don't know whether or not 
the tree has a designer. The claim that a universe could create itself cannot 
be disproved, but the idea lacks an intuitive analogous case as far as we 
know. So the argument from design is an abductive analogy whose 
hypothesis is not strictly valid but to which an equally comprehensible alter-
. 139Turing,"Computing Machinery and Intelligence", in Op. Cit. ,Horstadter and 
Dennett,p . 60 
140Hume ,Dialogue8 Concerning Natural Religion and the P08thumou8 E88aY8 
141Popkin, "Editor's Introduction" ,Ibid .,p. x 
142Hume,Ibid .,p. 15 
143Hume, quoted by Popkin, Ibid .,p. xiii 
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native has not been found. It seems to me that skepticism a.bout God's ex-
istence is based not so much on the non-determination of the similarity in 
th e argument as in observations which its hypothesis has a hard time ex-
plaining, e.g. Why would a Deity create evil, allow suffering, etc.? In the 
sciences, analogies are often abductive also a.nd, like Cleanthes' argument, 
have only one currently defined explanatory hypothesis, but the hypothesis 
is usually accepted unless there are observations it does not explain. Per-
haps this is an adjunct requirement which is needed for good abductive 
analogies to be convincing. When an abductive analogy without competing 
alternatives is unable to meet this addltional requirement, new theories are 
sought, but consistent new theories in science appear much easier to come 
by than ones for explailling how the order of the universe came to be. 
Hume was skeptical not only abou t proofs but also about disproofs. 144 
So my interpretation would be that Philo's grudging acceptance of the weak, 
"ambiguous· hypothesis is a response to the lack of apparent alternatives, 
but that tbere is, in his earlier denial that I.he causes of the universe are 
knowable, the lurking suspicion that the alterna.tive is out there somewhere, 
inconceivable to us because it has, in our world, no analogue. 
144Popkin,Ibid.,p. xiv 
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v. Conclusion 
What I do not have is a theory that will yield the same analysis of a 
given analogy from every analyst. I am aware, for instance, that 
Prettejohn's freedom analogy could be analyzed as a counter-example in-
stead of as a counter-analogy, and that the argument for other minds might 
be classed as weakly inductive instead of purely abductive. But I think that 
my theory of analogy does have some fairly clear consequences, which might 
be enumerated as follows: 
1. Treating analogy as a single form of argument and making global 
statements about its value should be seen to be untenable. 
Analogies run the gamut from logically valid to completely il-
legitimate. 
2. There is good reason to seek novel analogues which may have 
less a priori similarity with the central case than others have. 
Creative thinking involves the discovery of such novel analogies 
rather than just looking for the most similar analogous case and 
projecting a conclusion. Since determination and relevance are 
what are important, an analogous case can be very dissimilar to 
the central case and still provide useful conclusions. 
3. There is good reason to develop the critical thinking abilities 
needed to recognize when our natural acceptance of the 
Similarity Principle may be misleading us. A recognition that 
this principle has no validity is a good first step. And, 
4. Analogy has a unique, non-redundant function in logical 
problem-solving. When one knows a determination rule, one can 
examine a case analogous to that being worked on and conclude 
an implication rule at some level of legitimacy. 
Relative to traditional implication rules, determination constraints less-
en the informational detail needed in order to infer specific-case results. The 
best way to test how useful this is would probably be to implement the 
situational theory in a computer program. The computer could then be ex-
perimented upon, i.e. given an analogy and asked whether the analogy has 
any cogency. Such results could be compared to those produced by human 
beings who are asked the same questions. 
Experiments might also help in discovering whether or not -dyadic 
similarity - is crucial to the understanding of analogies. This, it might be 
recalled, is a level of equivalence that is really beyond analysis. I have so far 
assumed that a similarity can always be summarized as an identity of cer-
tain relations, but William James argued against this, saying, 
- ... any theory which would base likeness on identity, and not 
rather identity on likeness, must fail. It is supposed perhaps, by 
most people, that two resembling things owe their resemblance to 
their absolute identity in respect of some attribute or attributes 
combined with the absolute non-identity of the rest of their being. 
This, which may be true of compound things, breaks down when 
we come to simple impressions. _145 
One may imagine examples in which two terms might seem similar to us 
without being explicably similar, e.g. James's example of -blotting paper 
145 James, WiIliam,Principles 0/ Psychology (London: Macmillan and Co., 1Sgl),!,pp. 
532-533, cited io Op. Cit.,Myers,p. 327 
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voices·, two musical tones,146 and word pairs like 'up' and 'good' which are 
similar in connotation.147 The real question is whether this primitive level of 
similarity can be coded in a symbolic processing machine. 
While inferences cannot be justified solely on tIte basis of similarity, 
discovering similarity is crucial to the generation of testable analogies. For 
this reason, the study of similarity and of the analogy of being is a necessary 
step in defining a complete theory of analogy whlch I have not taken. The 
limitations of univocal predication may require a more elaborate form of 
semantic inference than symbolic implication, and the use of analog comput-
ing and analogue representations would surely require a clearer notion of the 
role of association in similarity cognition.148 
There are many additional aspects of analogical inference which I have 
not kad the time to explore. These would include tidying up the adjunct 
erit ria for inductive and abductive a.nalogy. Implementation of the theory 
would require algorithms for managing the complexity problems in similarity 
searches and matchlng, constraint chaining, contradiction cItecking and the 
like. The cogency of an inductive analogy cannot be determined 8.S the 
theory stands because there is no measure of how relevant each part of a 
determinant is to the conclusion. Finally, I have llot investiga.ted how 
people discover, or how machines should infer, determination constraints 
-- an ability which is clearly needed if a person or machine is to learn on his, 
her, or its own. But that is a problem for another day and an untired mind. 
146Myers, Ibid.,p. 326 
147This last example is from Professor David Wellbery, who mentioned it at my senior 
thesis colloquy 
148See Evans,The Varieties of Reference,pp. 292-294, for a discussion of the philosophy 
of similarity in reference; and Funt," Analogical Modes of Reasoning and Process 
Modeling" ,IEEE Computer,October 1983,pp. 99-104 on analogue representation, percep-
tion, and parallel processing 
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